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Abstract 
Marine recreational fisheries are ecologically, culturally, and economically important. However, 
ensuring effective management and compliance is notoriously difficult due to factors such as 
extensive coastlines, the sparse nature of recreational fishing, and lack of formal management 
infrastructure. Overcoming these obstacles is facilitated by fulfilling a wide range of objectives of 
recreational fisheries management. This is integral to ensuring sustainability, however, the effective 
management of recreational fisheries is further complicated due to diverse motivations of 
recreational fishing and uncertainty in fishers’ behavioural responses to management changes. 
Understanding the behavioural aspect or human dimensions of recreational fisheries management is 
necessary for effective evidence-based policy making, which contributes to fulfilling the management 
objectives. 
This thesis contributes towards more effective understanding of fishers by investigating the 
compliance behaviour and preferences within recreational fisheries management. Fisheries 
compliance literature recognises the integral role that behavioural incentives, such as social norms, 
morals and, legitimacy play in the compliance decision-making process. The overall objective of this 
thesis is to explore the role of behavioural incentives on compliance behaviour in recreational 
fisheries management and explore management preferences of fishers. This objective is addressed 
in the six subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
First, a general introduction of the context of the thesis is presented (Chapter 1). Chapter 2 explores 
the potential of behavioural based recreational fisheries management in detail through a narrative 
review of the relevant literature.  Specifically, it, explores the use of nudges, which are behavioural 
tools that aim through subtle changes and indirect suggestion to make certain decisions more salient. 
Chapter 3 empirically explores the influence of a descriptive social norm nudge on compliance 
behaviour and compares it with a traditionally used deterrence method of inspection. This is done 
through an economic laboratory experiment in a recreational fisheries context. The results show that 
the presence of descriptive social norm nudge can increase compliance behaviour but to a lesser 
extent than an increase in deterrence. Chapter 4 explores the results of this experiment further by 
investigating the relationship between behavioural drivers and compliance responses. Information 
for five psycho-social drivers - expectations of others’ behaviour, social norms, ecological values, 
v 
personality types, and risk preferences - was collected for each participant by survey. The results 
highlight patterns in psycho-social drivers and behavioural responses, which vary depending on the 
compliance incentive method applied to encourage compliance behaviour. Chapter 5 empirically 
explores the management preferences within a consumptive recreational fishery in Tasmania, 
Australia, with the aim of identifying the preferences of heterogeneous recreational fishers. This was 
conducted using a combination of a discrete choice experiment and an opinion-based phone survey. 
Results show that homogenous preferences were related to management that had a direct impact 
on catch, whereas heterogeneous preferences were found around management tools that had an 
indirect impact on catch. 
Together this research highlights several drivers of heterogeneity within recreational fishing 
management; from opposing responses to compliance incentives to varying psycho-social make-up 
within behavioural groups to divergent management preferences. The results of the research within 
this thesis provide empirical evidence of alternative compliance tools, such as nudges as well as 
drivers of different behaviours and opinions. The findings underline the importance of nuance and 
heterogeneity of fishers, behaviours, and drivers in the context of recreational fisheries. Knowledge 
of this variability encourages better integration of accurate human dimensions and can advance 
recreational fisheries towards innovation and increased effectiveness.  
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1.1 Background 
The world’s oceans are under pressure from climate change (Pecl et al. 2017), overfishing (Hobday et 
al. 2011), pollution (Vince & Hardesty 2018) and other anthropocentric threats that demonstrate an 
urgent need for sustainable ocean management (Aswani et al. 2018). Marine systems are changing 
faster than any other period in recorded history (UNEP 2006) and large and small marine fauna have 
decreased in abundance due to human activities (McCauley et al. 2015). To protect the marine-
provided goods and services which people depend on, sustainable management, conservation, and 
restoration of marine ecosystems are vital (IUCN 2017). Among many marine resource user groups, 
the fishing industry is one of the key industries with a responsibility to reduce marine impacts (Pauly 
& Zeller 2016). Many fisheries are managed under regulated open access regimes (Homans & Wilen 
1997; Reimer & Wilen 2013). This may fail to fully curtail the destructive race behaviours characteristic 
of users of a common pool resource, which can result in excessive fishing capacity and user congestion, 
and overuse of fish stocks.  The success of fisheries management depends on factors such as strong 
leadership, social capital, and incentives (Gutiérrez et al. 2011) as well as having congruent objectives 
(Hilborn 2007). Incorporating human behaviour into research, management and policy is pivotal to 
ensuring that these factors are promoted to improve marine resource management and conservation 
in the Anthropocene (Halpern et al. 2008; Aswani et al. 2018; Van Putten et al. 2012).  
In the literature, attention towards better understanding of human behaviours has been mostly aimed 
at commercial or subsistence fishing (Pecl et al. 2014). Nonetheless, the  importance of recreational 
fishing ecologically (Arlinghaus 2005), socially and culturally (Cooke & Schramm 2007; Palmer 2004), 
as well as economically (Steinback et al. 2004) highlight the need for behavioural research in this 
domain in a time of rapid global ocean change (van Putten et al. 2017). A better understanding of 
recreational fishers behaviours and their diverse motivations and preferences can reduce unintended 
outcomes of management interventions (Pine et al. 2009) and better predict and assist how 
recreational fisheries adapt to changing environments and evolve to maintain resilience and 
sustainability on a global scale (Arlinghaus et al. 2013). Human dimensions research in recreational 
fisheries has also demonstrated the importance of the heterogeneity in recreational fishers’ 
motivations, behaviours, and preferences (Beardmore 2013; Matsumura et al., 2019). In fact, the 
heterogeneity of fishers is thought to be a key ingredient of the complex dynamics of recreational 
fisheries and key for better management (Post 2013).  
Recreational fisheries are traditionally managed via a mixture of regulations and rules (Morison 2004). 
However, achieving an acceptable rate of compliance in recreational fisheries is inherently difficult 
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because there is often no formal mechanism to monitor and record the actions of recreational fishers 
(Green & McKinlay 2009). Non-compliance is a tenacious problem in recreational fisheries 
management, posing a risk to marine conservation and socio-ecological systems (Post et al. 
2011;Blank & Gavin 2009; Arias & Sutton 2013;Smallwood & Beckley 2012). In fisheries management, 
deterrence-based approaches have traditionally been used to tackle non-compliance. However, 
sufficient monitoring and enforcement are often limited and prohibitively costly in recreational 
fisheries and an alternative approach is needed to improve compliance (Cooke et al. 2013). In response 
to this, behaviour change initiatives that are not based solely on deterrence methods are beginning 
to be proposed and implemented to improve compliance (Battista et al. 2018). 
This thesis contributes towards more effective understanding of fishers by investigating the 
compliance behaviour and preferences within recreational fisheries management. Policy making to 
ensure compliance and contribute towards sustainable recreational fisheries management is not 
straightforward with dissonant and diverse objectives that are conditional on stakeholders’ priorities 
(Aanesen et al. 2014). Fisheries compliance literature recognises the integral role that behavioural 
incentives, such as social norms, morals and legitimacy play in the compliance decision making process. 
This thesis specifically explores the role of behavioural incentives on compliance behaviour in 
recreational fisheries management and explores management preferences of fishers. Understanding 
the behavioural aspect or human dimensions of recreational fisheries management is necessary for 
effective evidence-based policy making, which contributes to fulfilling management objectives. 
1.2 Recreational fishing 
Recreational fishing is a popular recreational activity in many places around the world (Smallwood & 
Beckley 2012), with global estimates ranging from 220 million (World Bank et al. 2012) to 700 million 
recreational fishers (Cooke & Cowx 2004). There are several associated benefits derived from 
recreational fishing. It generates significant economic benefits to communities, for example through 
the flow-on economic and employment benefits arising from fisher expenditure and tourism 
(Cisneros-Montemayor & Sumaila 2010). For example, the total economic impact of marine 
recreational fishing amounts to 10.5 billion Euro, supporting almost 100,000 jobs (Hyder et al. 2017). 
There are physical and psychological health and social benefits from fishing (Griffiths et al. 2017), as 
recreational fishing is found to strengthen social ties as well as reduce heart rate and anxiety, and 
increase connectedness with nature (Hughes 2014). Recreational fishing has also been recognised as 
providing an important source of protein for fishers (Cooke & Cowx 2006; Cooke et al. 2018).  
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Despite various benefits derived from recreational fishing, global recreational fisheries are generally 
poorly understood relative to commercial fishing (Young et al. 2014). Ubiquitous to recreational 
fishing research is the recognition of a lack of official reported data due to limited monitoring and 
enforcement (Dickson et al. 2009). As a result, the scale and impact of recreational fisheries are 
frequently underestimated (Cooke & Cowx 2006; Lewin et al. 2006). It is estimated that recreational 
fisheries only account for 1 million tons of catch annually, a small proportion relative to total global 
catch at approximately 120 million tons (Pauly & Zeller 2016). However, the ecological impact from 
recreational fisheries is locally and regionally consequential (Lewin et al. 2006; Cooke & Cowx 2006) 
and is attributed with contributing to the global fisheries decline (Worm et al. 2009; Cooke & Cowx 
2004). To reduce these impacts, recreational fisheries are typically managed by the same regulations 
as in commercial fisheries (Cooke & Cowx 2006). The effective management of recreational fisheries 
is further complicated due to diverse motivations of recreational fishers and uncertainty in fishers’ 
behavioural responses to management changes. Motivations of commercial fishers are predominantly 
related to economic rewards, whereas recreational fishing is fundamentally a leisure activity and 
motivations vary extensively (Cooke et al. 2019; Fedler & Ditton 1994). Despite the differences in 
motivations, scale, and capacity, the assumption is often made that conventional commercial fisheries 
management methods are applicable to recreational fisheries management.  
Non-compliance with regulations in the global conservation context remains one of the largest illegal 
activities in the world, resulting in degradation to societies, economies and the environment (Haken 
2011; Arias 2015). Ensuring compliance with regulations is a key element in effective fisheries 
management to encourage sustainability. Due to factors such as extensive coastlines, the sparse 
nature of recreational fishing, and lack of formal management infrastructure, non-compliance occurs 
within recreational fisheries (Bergseth 2017; Bergseth & Roscher 2018). Broadly, compliance can be 
viewed as a function of deterrence and voluntary compliance. Deterrence is the outcome of 
deliberately implemented prevention tactics including the likelihood of getting caught and the severity 
of the repercussions. Voluntary compliance, on the other hand, occurs when people willingly choose 
to adhere to the rules and regulations regardless of the expected repercussions of non-compliance 
(Putt & Nelson 2008). For many recreational fisheries around the world where enforcement is limited 
or ineffective, an alternative to management based solely on deterrence – which is central to 
commercial fisheries - is needed to encourage voluntary compliance behaviour (Cooke et al. 2013; 
Arias & Sutton 2013; Arias 2015; Bergseth & Roscher 2018). 
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1.3 Compliance behaviour and incentives 
An incentive is something that motivates an action and can be effective at changing behaviours. The 
importance of designing incentives for fishers to voluntary comply with regulations is well recognised 
(Chen 2010; Cooke et al. 2013; Read et al. 2011). Broadly, incentives can be monetary or non-
monetary with various effectiveness in different contexts (Gneezy et al. 2011). Traditional 
perspectives on compliance assumed monetary incentives were the main driver in compliance 
decisions, while more socialised views have emerged with the roles of social norms, legitimacy and 
fairness playing a large part (Honneland 1999; Nostbakken 2013; Sutinen & Kuperan 1999). These non-
monetary, or behavioural, incentives, such as the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social 
disapproval (Fehr & Falk 2002), can also shape and encourage behaviour changes by targeting 
voluntary compliance. 
Understanding of behavioural drivers is yet to be adequately applied in management, as harnessing 
social norms, legitimacy and personal morality into action is challenging. Additionally, there is a gap 
in the literature examining the efficacy of compliance tools based on behavioural incentives at 
encouraging voluntary compliance behaviour. Nudges may be an example of a behavioural incentive-
based tool to encourage voluntary compliance. Nudge theory argues that through positive 
reinforcement or indirect suggestion, non-forced compliance can be achieved. The term ‘nudge’ was 
first coined by Thaler & Sunstein in their book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and 
Happiness (2008) with a nudge defined broadly as a change to “any aspect of choice architecture that 
alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing 
their economic incentives” (2008;6). Choice architecture refers here to the way in which options are 
presented to people that in turn may influence their choice. More specifically, nudges can fall under 
the following categories, i) simplification and framing of information, ii) changes to physical 
environment, iii) changes to the default policy, and iv) use of social norms and comparisons (Mont et 
al. 2014; Lehner et al. 2016). The use of nudges in public policy has increased over the past decade 
(Benartzi et al. 2017), including examples in energy conservation and energy efficiency investments, 
transport choices, water conservation and sustainable food consumption (OECD 2017a; OECD 2017b). 
Examples specifically targeting compliance behaviour can be found in taxation (Cadsby et al. 2006; Li 
et al. 2011) and  environmental regulation (Behavioural Insights Team 2015). While the use of nudges 
in marine management has been advocated for ( e.g. Cvitanovic et al. 2018) there is little evidence of 
their application in addressing compliance issues in recreational fisheries management and they have 
yet to be tested in a controlled setting. 
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1.4 Thesis aims and structure 
This thesis specifically aims to explore the role of behavioural incentives on compliance behaviour in 
recreational fisheries management and explores management preferences of fishers. Through this 
research the heterogeneity of behaviours and preferences in response to incentives can be explored. 
The approach adopted in this thesis is an interdisciplinary perspective drawing on behavioural and 
experimental economics, supplemented with contextual understanding of fisheries management and 
social psychology. This thesis draws on different methodologies including narrative literature reviews, 
empirical research using experimental data and choice modelling, to contribute to a better 
understanding of the behaviours and preferences of recreational fishers. This aim is explored in the 
five subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 2 explores the potential of behavioural based management through a narrative review of the 
relevant literature; specifically, exploring the use of nudges, which are behavioural tools that aim 
through subtle changes and indirect suggestion to make certain decisions more salient, thereby 
improving voluntary compliance. This concept is explored with specific reference to the compliance 
of fishers within Australian recreational fisheries. There are only a few examples of behavioural based 
approaches found. However, based on their theoretical foundations, nudges may represent an 
inexpensive, and potentially highly effective tool for recreational fisheries management. Nudges do 
not offer a ‘quick fix’ to cases where traditional policy instruments have failed. Rather, there is the 
potential for behavioural nudges (based on framing, changing the physical environment, presenting 
default options, and social norms) to augment and complement existing deterrence regimes. Several 
potential nudges for compliance management in recreational fisheries are suggested, but caution is 
advised. As with any novel management approach, nudges must be rigorously tested to demonstrate 
their cost-effectiveness and to avoid unintended consequences.  
In Chapter 3, we explore the lessons from behavioural economics and apply nudge theory as the basis 
of alternative management approaches. Nudge theory argues that through positive reinforcement or 
indirect suggestion, voluntary compliance can be achieved. The aim of this chapter is to test the 
influence of a nudge, based on a descriptive social norm, through an economic laboratory experiment 
in a recreational fisheries context. Social norms have been used successfully previously to promote 
pro-social and pro-environmental behaviour, for example to encourage  voting attendance (Gerber & 
Rogers 2009) and energy conservation (Allcott 2009). However, to the best of our knowledge the 
effectiveness of a descriptive social norm in any recreational fishing context has yet to be quantified 
or tested. We achieve this aim by addressing the following three research questions: 1) Does the use 




of a descriptive social norm nudge change the decision on the quantity of fish caught in a recreational 
fishery and does it influence compliance with a regulation (i.e. catch limit)? 2) Does the effect of a 
descriptive social norm nudge depend on the level of traditional deterrence-based interventions in 
place? 3) Do individuals’ preference for risk affect compliance behaviour in the presence of a 
descriptive social norm nudge? 
 
Within Chapter 4 the results from Chapter 3 are further explored. While we know that in fisheries 
people make trade-off decisions between following or breaking rules, it is of interest to determine 
how people respond to different management incentives. The overall aim of this chapter is to examine 
what psycho-social characteristics of individuals are associated with responses to management 
incentives in a recreational fisheries context. The psycho-social characteristics considered in this 
chapter were (1) expectation of behaviour of others, (2) social norms, (3) ecological values, (4) 
personality types, and (5) risk preferences. While there is literature reviewing and testing some of the 
characteristics mentioned relating to compliance behaviours in fishing and non-fishing contexts, there 
is a gap in the literature exploring these characteristics concurrently within a controlled experimental 
setting. The implication of such a study will contribute to the gap in identifying the patterns in those 
who are consistently compliant, those who free-ride, and those who are influenced as intended by 
improving compliant behaviour for different incentives. 
 
Chapter 5 examines fishers’ management preferences towards different management tools in a highly 
consumptive recreational fishery. Specifically, this chapter uses a combination of a discrete choice 
experiment and an opinion-based survey to explore the potential heterogeneity in management 
preferences in the Tasmanian recreational Rock Lobster fishery, Australia. Although the fishery has 
extensive management in place, further restrictions are required to limit the amount of lobster caught 
for the recreational sector due to declining stocks. As a diverse fishery, with various fishing methods 
and a range of avidity levels, it is expected that the effects of management changes vary across 
different fisher groups as well as the type of restrictions imposed. A phone survey was used to ask 
fishers’ opinions on how effective different management tools are at restricting catch and if they 
supported or opposed the tool. Additionally, a discrete choice experiment was used to assess if fishers’ 
utility is associated with a management tool and to what extent fishers are willing to trade a change 
in one management tool for a change in another.  
 
The final chapter concludes this thesis and offers opportunities for future research.  
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This thesis is presented in the style of thesis by publication. Each of the thesis core chapters are 
prepared in the style of journal articles which have been published, submitted or intended to submit 
for review to academic journals. The nature of this style of thesis, however, can generate some 
repetition of contextual information within the chapters, although this has been kept to a minimum. 
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Chapter 2 - When push comes to shove in recreational fishing 
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2.1 Introduction 
Fishing is a popular recreational activity in many places around the world (Smallwood & Beckley 2012). 
The global estimation of recreational fishing1 participation is around 11% of people (Arlinghaus et al. 
2015) with an estimated number of fishers ranging between 220 million (FAO 2012) and 700 million 
(Cooke & Cowx 2004). Recreational fishing provides participants with a number of social, economic 
and health benefits (Cooke & Schramm 2007; Ihde et al. 2011) as well as a potential source of protein 
(Cooke & Cowx 2006; Cooke et al. 2018). In some cases it also generates significant social and 
economic benefits to communities, for example through the flow-on economic and employment 
benefits arising from fisher expenditure and tourism (Cisneros-Montemayor & Sumaila 2010). Many 
recreational fisheries are managed under regulated open access regimes (Homans & Wilen 1997), 
which fail to fully curtail the destructive race behaviours characteristic of users of a common pool 
resource, which can result in excessive fishing capacity and user congestion, and overuse of fish stocks. 
Recreational fisheries are, therefore, prone to over-exploitation and with the most valued commercial 
species often targeted (Coleman et al. 2004), recreational fisheries have been credited with 
contributing to global fisheries declines (Worm et al. 2009; Cooke & Cowx 2004). 
Global recreational fisheries are generally understudied, poorly understood (Young et al. 2014),  and 
their scale and impact are largely underestimated  (Cooke & Cowx 2006; Lewin et al. 2006; Pauly & 
Zeller 2016). For example, in Australia, recreational harvest is substantial and exceeds the commercial 
catch for a number of species, including Yellowtail Kingfish (Lowry et al. 2016), Blue Swimmer Crab 
and Snapper (McPhee et al. 2002). More widely, monitoring, surveillance and enforcement efforts by 
management are well below those for commercial fisheries (Haggarty et al. 2016). This is often due to 
capacity shortfalls in staff and financial resources (Gill et al. 2017) and consequently, very few 
comprehensive records of catch and effort exist (Cabanellas-Reboredo et al. 2017). The impacts of 
recreational fishing can affect size structure, stock abundance and evolutionary trajectories (Lewin et 
al. 2006), and will be further heightened by technological improvements (McPhee et al. 2002). 
However, poor knowledge and understanding of these impacts challenges the effectiveness of 
sustainable management (Arias 2015; Arias et al. 2016). To date, initiatives to limit and control 
recreational fishing activity have focused on addressing symptoms and not on the underlying causes 
of problems because of this lack of understanding (Cooke & Cowx 2004). 
1
 Recreational fishing is often defined as any recreational activity that removes aquatic organisms, including 
but not limited to line fishing, spearfishing, netting and collecting (Smallwood & Beckley 2012). 
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The overall approach to recreational fisheries management has tended to mirror that of the 
commercial fisheries with a heavy emphasis on the use of regulatory tools, such as effort regulation 
and catch limits (Cooke & Cowx 2006). Ensuring compliance with such regulations is therefore a key 
element in effective fisheries management. Non-compliance with regulations in the global 
conservation context remains one of the largest illegal activities in the world, resulting in degradation 
to societies, economies and the environment (Haken 2011; Arias 2015). The threats that non-
compliance poses on marine conservation and marine socio-ecological systems are also consequential; 
non-compliance has the potential to undermine management (Sullivan 2004) and sustainability 
(Keane et al. 2008), and to create conflict between user groups (Cooke & Cowx 2006; Kearney 2001). 
Conversely, ensuring recreational fishers’ compliance with rules and regulations is particularly difficult 
due to factors such as the high number of participants and costs of enforcement, the absence of 
regular monitoring of recreational fishing activity, and the inherent difficulties in accurately 
determining catches. While management of both sectors  tends to emphasise instrumental factors like 
economic incentives and deterrence for ensuring compliance (King & Sutinen 2010; Nielsen & 
Mathiesen 2003), the absence of formal management infrastructure in recreational fisheries (i.e. 
landing obligations, log books, electronic monitoring or on-board observers) renders this approach 
less effective and suggests the need for an alternative approach. 
Although recreational and commercial fisheries share a number of characteristics, and enforcement 
and management tend to be similar, the two are fundamentally different (Cowx 2002). In particular, 
while  commercial and recreational fishers  both positively respond to catch rates, recreational fishers 
are generally more motivated by non-catch incentives (Arlinghaus 2006a). Non-catch motivations can 
be broadly categorised into three groups; mastery motivations such as mental stimulation (Beard, 
Jacob & Ragheb, Mounir 1980), achievement (Kuehn et al. 2013; Hunt & Ditton 2001) and trophy 
winning (Sutton 2003); social factors (Magee et al. 2018; Dillard & Bates 2011), and escapism (White 
2008; Henry & Lyle 2003). Since the main drivers for recreational fishing behaviour extend beyond the 
key economic drivers of commercial fishing, the instruments needed for effective management of 
recreational fishing are likely to differ from those used in commercial fisheries. Despite this, such 
instruments have typically dominated recreational fisheries (Cooke et al. 2013). Moreover, the need 
to incorporate human dimensions for compliance management in recreational fisheries is increasingly 
being recognised and advocated for (Bergseth 2017; Arlinghaus et al. 2016; Hunt et al. 2013) and the 
use of voluntary and informal institutions for recreational fisheries management have been suggested 
(Cooke et al. 2013). However, the application of behaviourally-based approaches for compliance 
management has yet to be explored.  
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The overall aim of this chapter is to highlight how behavioural nudges may fill a critical gap in current 
fisheries management and improve recreational fishing compliance outcomes. The potential for lesser 
used, non-traditional approaches is highlighted through a narrative review of the peer reviewed 
literature on behavioural theory, specifically nudge theory. Nudge theory argues that through positive 
reinforcement or indirect suggestion, non-forced compliance can be achieved. The chapter aim is 
achieved with specific reference to the case of Australian recreational fisheries, which have 
particularly high participation and a fisheries regulatory regime typical of developed countries. 
Additionally, there is a considerable wealth of literature on recreational fisheries in Australia, 
specifically with a focus on compliance. A brief background of relevant compliance theory is provided 
along with the definition of nudge theory (Section 2), followed by a review of the compliance issues 
and current management within Australian case literature (Section 3). This provides the context for 
discussing which behavioural nudges may be effective in influencing compliance behaviour, with 
examples provided (Section 4). The chapter concludes by identifying a series of challenges and design 
considerations which will influence the effectiveness of nudges within recreational fisheries in 
Australia and elsewhere (Section 5).  
2.2 Compliance theory in recreational fisheries 
2.2.1 Traditional compliance theory 
Compliance is defined for this chapter as adhering to the rules and regulations by recreational fishers. 
Compliance can be interpreted as either binary, i.e. no compliance vs. compliance, or as a spectrum, 
i.e. ‘high’, ‘medium’, ‘low’ (Arias 2015). The latter interpretation is more pertinent when considering
compliance management as it is consistent with the notion that compliance is malleable and that
gradual behavioural change can transition compliance along a gradient, rather than requiring
behaviour to move from one opposite disposition to another. Non-compliance can be accidental or
deliberate and can occur on a range of scales and frequencies, for example catching an undersized fish
after a recent amendment to size restrictions, or a conscious, organised effort to catch a high value
species with the intention to profit from sales. Compliance can be viewed as a function of deterrence
and voluntary compliance. Deterrence is the outcome of deliberately implemented prevention tactics
including the likelihood of getting caught and the severity of the repercussions. Voluntary compliance,
on the other hand, occurs when people willingly choose to adhere to the rules and regulations
regardless of the expected repercussions of non-compliance (Putt & Nelson 2008).
Identifying the determinants of compliance and knowing what drives compliance behaviour is complex, 
and this is reflected in the evolution of compliance theories and models. Becker (1968) was the first 
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to model the broad components of compliance and to discuss how to choose enforcement levels. 
Based on the assumption of rational economic behaviour, this model assumes that the decision to 
infringe is based on the expected return to breaking the rules, taking into account the direct returns 
and costs of different compliance behaviours, and the risk of detection and punishment. Some 
fisheries compliance models have built on Becker’s model to include some of the complexity, 
incorporating additional parameters including individual effort (Anderson & Lee 1986) and personality 
types (Chavez & Salgado 2005). However, they are still better equipped for explaining compliance 
behavior where economic drivers dominate (i.e. commercial fisheries) and inadequately capture the 
full complexity of the problem (Nøstbakken 2008). 
The recognition that compliance behaviour is not solely based on economic gains is expanding and is 
reflected in compliance models relaxing the assumption of pure instrumental rationality of agents and 
acknowledging the importance of normative behavioural drivers. Expansion of fisheries compliance 
models used concepts from psychology and sociology to extend the rational choice model to also 
include intrinsic values such as personal morality, social reputation and legitimacy (Kuperan & Sutinen 
1998; Sutinen & Kuperan 1999). Intrinsic values and informal management have been integrated 
within theoretical models of commercial fisheries (Hatcher et al. 2000; MacKenzie & Cox 2013; Nielsen 
& Mathiesen 2003; Nøstbakken 2013; Xepapadeas 2005). However, only recently have  compliance 
models been tested on recreational fishing compliance behaviour (Thomas et al. 2016). The 
integration of normative drivers results in better prediction of compliance behaviour, with psycho-
social factors such as social norms, being the most significant driver compared to instrumental drivers 
(Thomas et al. 2016). Therefore, the predictors of compliance are broader than the earlier deterrence 
models assumed, and the instrumental factors, upon which recreational compliance management is 
largely based, might not be adequate. Understanding of normative drivers is yet to be adequately 
applied in management, as harnessing social norms, legitimacy and personal morality into action is 
challenging. However, this is a gap that nudges, as successfully trialled and tested tools in influencing 
behaviour in other domains, may fill. 
2.2.2 Nudge theory 
If deterrence relies on shoving people to make certain decisions (such as complying with rules), a 
nudge can be thought of as a subtler way to encourage a decision that is in people’s best interest. For 
example, while it is rationally in people’s best interest to save for retirement, and most countries offer 
tax incentives to do so, people frequently still do not save enough for retirement (Madrian & Shea 
2001). A nudge to overcome this is to apply an auto-enrolment into saving schemes, to make this 
decision more salient and increase average saving rates (i.e. up to 13.6% (Thaler & Benartzi 2004).  
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The term ‘nudge’ was first coined by Thaler & Sunstein in their book Nudge: Improving Decisions about 
Health, Wealth and Happiness (2008) with a nudge defined broadly as a change to “any aspect of 
choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options 
or significantly changing their economic incentives” (2008;6). Choice architecture refers here to the 
way in which options are presented to people that in turn may influence their choice. There have been 
a number of iterations of the definition of a nudge since Thaler and Sunstein (Hausman & Welch 2010; 
Hansen & Jespersen 2013; Mongin & Mikaël Cozic 2017; Thaler & Sunstein 2008). The most 
encompassing definition is provided by Hansen (2016, 16) who states that a nudge is “a function of 
any attempt at influencing people’s judgment, choice or behaviour in a predictable way (1) that is 
made possible because of cognitive boundaries, biases, routines and habits in individual and social 
decision-making posing barriers for people to perform rationally in their own declared self-interests 
and which (2) works by making use of those boundaries, biases, routines, and habits as integral parts 
of such attempts”. The theory that underpins the ability of nudges to produce such changes is, 
therefore, primarily based upon insights from behavioural economics and encompasses ideas from 
both psychology and sociology (John et al. 2011; Whitehead et al. 2014). Nudges rely on understanding 
and being able to predict how and why human behaviour deviates from that predicted by standard 
economic theory. Nudges are designed interventions that target the behavioural biases that arise from 
the three acknowledged bounds of human behaviour2 (Mullainathan & Thaler 2015). 
Nudging, therefore, is about changing the choice environment to make certain options more salient, 
broadly through indirect suggestion or positive reinforcement. Equally important to understanding 
what a nudge is, is to understand what is not a nudge. Hansen (2016;16) clarifies that “a nudge 
amongst other things works independently of: “(i) forbidding or adding any rational relevant choice 
options, (ii) changing incentives, whether regarded in terms of time, trouble, social sanctions, 
economic and so forth, or (iii) the provision of information or rational argumentation”. For instance, 
in the context of compliance with a shorter catch season for the female of a species, according to the 
definition above the following would not be considered a nudge: (i) forbidding the catch of female all 
year round, which would forbid the choice option; (ii) incorporating a tagging system for females that 
is allocated through an application based lottery process, which would change incentives by increasing 
the effort required; (iii) providing factual information on the ecological importance of not catching 
females during spawning season.  
2
 There are three acknowledged bounds which are; bounded rationality, which reflects the limited cognitive 
abilities that constrain human problem solving; bounded willpower, captures the fact that people sometimes 
make choices that are not in their long-run interest and bounded self-interest, incorporates the  fact that humans 
are often willing to sacrifice their own interests to help others (Mullainathan & Thaler 2015). 




2.3 Current management and compliance issues: an Australian perspective 
2.3.1 Current regulatory management 
The importance of recreational fisheries in Australia is recognised economically, culturally, and 
ecologically (Brooks et al. 2015). Recreational fishing participation in Australia is high, with about 3.5 
million people (14% of the population) fishing at least once each year (Fisheries Research and 
Development Corporation 2016). Due to factors such as the extensive Australian coastline, the 
absence of regular monitoring of recreational fishers, and the high costs of enforcement, ensuring 
compliance with rules and regulations is challenging. Compliance in recreational fisheries has been of 
high interest in Australia, with numerous academic efforts made to better understand such a 
tenacious problem (Bergseth et al. 2017; Bergseth & Roscher 2018; Arias & Sutton 2013; Smallwood 
& Beckley 2012), as well as governmental and managerial efforts to improve compliance (Green & 
McKinlay 2009; NFCC 2015; Putt & Nelson 2007). Sub-culture theory would suggest that groups, such 
as recreational fishers, share norms and values (Bergseth & Roscher 2018; Fischer 1995). This, 
combined with the high participation rates and cultural importance recreational fishing has in 
Australia (Henry & Lyle 2003), makes it a good case for exploring the potential of behavioural nudges 
for enhancing compliance. 
 
Within the Australian fishing zone it is the State and Territory governments that assume responsibility 
for recreational fishing (AFMA 2013), with a few larger pelagic species being the exception, such as 
Bluefin Tuna and certain shark species managed under Commonwealth and international jurisdiction 
(Tracey et al. 2013). Recreational fisheries in Australia are managed via a mixture of regulations and 
rules that either aim to control fishers’ input or their output (Morison 2004). Input management aims 
to control who is allowed to fish, where they are allowed to fish, when they are allowed to fish and 
how they are allowed to fish. This includes any type of access controls such as licenses and fishing 
rights, as well as spatial controls such as protected areas. Output controls on the other hand address 
what and how much people are allowed to catch. This includes both quantitative and qualitative 
restrictions. Total allowable catch and bag limits are quantitative restrictions on the mass or numbers 
of fish harvested, whereas, qualitative output controls are restrictions on sex, species or size limits.  
 
There are several consistencies and differences in management delivered across all state jurisdictions. 
There are uniform regulations on the removal of threatened species and every coastal jurisdiction has 
size, bag and possession limits for certain species with some also having boat limits. However, the 
specific details differ e.g. the size limit for Bream in Tasmania is 25cm, but it is 30cm in South Australia. 
For reasons such as protecting spawning stocks during reproductive periods, there are temporal 
closed seasons in every jurisdiction, except the Northern Territory. There are some differences in the 
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requirements for recreational fishing licenses across Australia. For example, while recreational fishers 
in New South Wales and Victoria require licenses for any fishing activity, in the Northern Territory, 
South Australia and Queensland they do not require general or specific gear or species licenses for 
recreational fishing activities. Within Western Australia and Tasmania, fishers do not require general 
recreational fisheries licenses but there are gear and species-specific licenses (for species such as 
Western and Southern Rock Lobster, respectively). 
Through monitoring and enforcement of these regulations, punishments for non-compliance include 
issuing fines, loss of fishing licenses and for extreme cases, imprisonment. Empirical research on 
compliance in green zones within the Great Barrier Reef in Australia found that the fear of being fined 
is ranked as the highest compliance driver for not fishing within marine reserves (Arias & Sutton 2013), 
however the perception of higher catches in reserves and a low probability of detection are ranked as 
the primary motivations of non-compliant behaviour within these reserves (Bergseth et al. 2017). In a 
New Zealand recreational fishery, instrumental factors, such as probability of detection and 
probability of conviction, were found not to be significant drivers of compliance behavior (Thomas et 
al. 2016), and generally compliance management solely based on economic incentives targeting 
deterrence has been questioned (Arlinghaus et al. 2002). Accordingly  management is being advised 
to emphasise and encourage voluntary compliance behaviour (Arias & Sutton 2013; Arias 2015; 
Bergseth & Roscher 2018). 
2.3.2 Compliance Issues 
The review of compliance issues is delivered as a narrative review that considers academic, policy and 
grey literature to provide context for the subsequent discussion of behavioural incentives. This 
literature review highlighted some pertinent compliance issues within recreational fisheries in 
Australia, including but not limited to the ten compliance issues found in Table 2.1. Of these 
compliance issues, five represent violations of input controls with examples of issues violating each of 
the four types of input control (i.e. who, where, when and how). Fishing without a licence, for example, 
violates management controls that prescribe who is permitted to fish, and fishing with restricted gear 
is non-compliance with how to fish. The remaining five issues represent violations of output controls, 
with what was being caught comprising the majority of the compliance issues, including retaining 
juvenile fish, ignoring biotoxin or consumption warnings, illegal selling of catch and fishing for 
protected species. The other output control that was violated was regarding how much is being caught 
i.e. exceeding catch limits. Several the compliance issues raised within this review relate to violations
of output controls, relating to what and how much is being caught, suggesting these controls may
require additional management tools for compliance. Table 2.1 also provides specific examples of each
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of the compliance issues, a description of the current legislation and maximum financial punishment, 
the type of monitoring and, if suggested in the literature, an alternative, non-fiscal management 
alternative. Currently most compliance issues are managed through deterrence-based legislation 
requiring some sort of monitoring, with few examples of informal enforcement or compliance 
measures targeting voluntary compliance. 
The financial repercussions for fishers who do not comply with regulations ranged from a $50 on the 
spot fine, to as much as $400,000 for trafficking a commercial quantity of a priority fish species 
(Western Australian Department of Fisheries 2010). A national study of crime in the Australian fishing 
industry stated that stakeholders believe legislation had inadequate penalty provisions and there was 
doubt in the prosecution and sentencing (Putt & Nelson 2008). This is reflective of generally low 
conviction rates globally for recreational fisheries with a noted rarity of prosecution of fisheries crime 
and leniency when it does occur (Minter 2008). Overall perceived low conviction rates may reflect the 
fact that in jurisdictions other than  Victoria and New South Wales, numbers of convictions and fines 
are not publicised, for example through fisheries department websites (Victoria State Government 
2016; NSW Department of Fisheries 2016). Other forms of information sharing is used, for example 
through press releases on successful convictions and increases in monitoring within the Great Barrier 
Reef, in New South Wales (GBRMPA 2018), and fisheries departments sharing convictions on non-
compliance on Facebook, which will reinforce the norm and perception of enforcement (Tasmanian 
Fisheries 2017). 
.
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Table 2.1 Common compliance issues within Australian recreational fisheries and associated legislation, financial punishment, and monitoring, and if noted 
any non-fiscal incentives for combating non-compliance. 
Management 






incentives Literature cited 
Input 
Who Fishing without a license 
Fisherman fined after being 
caught without licence in New 
South Wales (NSW Department 
of Fisheries 2008) 
Fisheries Management Act 
1994 of New South Wales 
$200 on the spot fine 
and upwards of 
$210-2500 
Fisheries officers Voluntary code of conduct 
Lloret et al. 2008 
Greiner et al. 2000; 
NSW Department of 
Fisheries 2008 
Where 
Fishing within protected 
areas 
Fishing within green zones in 
the Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Protected Area, and the 
Ningaloo Marine Park 
(Bergseth et al. 2015; 
(Smallwood & Beckley 2012) 
The Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 
fines, confiscation of 
property court 










fishers in planning 
Bergseth et al. 
2015;McCook et al. 
2010; Smallwood & 
Beckley 2012; Read et 
al. 2011; Sethi & 
Hilborn 2008 
Not complying with 
territory rules resulting 
in conflicts / interfering 
with others gear 
Conflict between recreational 
and commercial fishers in New 
South Wales/Western 
Australian (Beattie 2016) 
Fisheries Act 2010 





Self-reporting N/A Beattie 2016;Kearney 2002 
When  Fishing within closed season 
Western Australian fishermen 
fishing within closed seasons 
(WA News 2009) 
Fisheries management 
(General) regulation 2007 
First offence—$10 
000; for a second or 
subsequent 
offence—$20 000. 
Aerial Surveys Rights based fishing 
Kearney 2001; 
Smallwood & Beckley 
2012 
How 
Not complying with gear 
restrictions resulting in 
boat impacts on 
environment 
Damage to seagrass beds/ 
reefs from unsuitable gear in 
Victoria (Kearney 2002) 
Fisheries Act 1995 of 
Victoria. The Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park Act 1975 
$2,000-$10,000 in 






Codes of conducts 
and restricted 
access penalties not 
just monetary 
Kearney 2002; Great 
Barrier Reef Marine 
Park Amendment Bill 
2001 
Output What  
Illegal selling of catch 
Failing to clip the tail rock 
lobster to sell on (Putt & 
Nelson 2007) 
Fisheries management 
(General) regulation 2007 Max penalty $5,000 Marine police 
Community 
reporting 
Kearney 2002;Putt & 
Nelson 2007 
Fishing for protected 
species 
Queensland shark finning 
(Shiffman et al. 2014) 
Fish resources management 
Act 1994 $1000-$5000 
On site landing 
checks 
Using length instead 
of mass in trophy 
fishing 




Fishing and eating during 
biotoxin closures in Tasmania 
(Tasmanian Government 2016) 
Informal / advisory N/A N/A 
Co-management 
assisting with risk 





Retention of juvenile 
fish 
Keeping juvenile finfish in 
South Western Australia (ABC 
2012) 
Fish Resources 
Management Act 1994 of 
Western Australia 
$2,000 Fisheries officers Expansion of volunteer programs 
McPhee et al. 2002; 
Kearney 2002; Blyth et 
al. 2002; ABC 2012 
How 
much  Exceeding catch limits 
Queensland fisherman caught 
50 times the limit (Hall 2016) ; 
Western Australian fishers 
caught 405 abalone over limit 
(Beattie 2016) 
Fisheries Act 1994 of 
Queensland. Fish Resources 
Management Act 1994 of 
Western Australia 
$4,000 
Penalties up to 
$400,000 
Queensland Boating 




Shame file in 
Queensland paper 
Beattie 2016; Hall 
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In addition to the laws and regulations in place to manage the non-compliance issues, there were also 
non-fiscal incentive-based ways of addressing compliance that touch on behavioural understanding 
(Table 2.1). These include co-management, and increased participation in, and expansion of, volunteer 
programs. These types of initiatives build upon trust and legitimacy of user groups, which have been 
shown to encourage compliance (Karper & Lopes 2014; MacKenzie & Cox 2013). Every State has an 
illegal fishing hotline for members of the public to report any illegal fishing activity they witness such 
as Fishwatch in Tasmania and New South Wales or 13FISH in Victoria. There is no punishment for not 
reporting any illegal activity through the hotline and generally there is no financial incentive to do so. 
The presence of self-monitoring by peers is a benefit to any compliance management as it increases 
monitoring capability and reinforces social acceptability of behaviours. The Great Barrier Marine Park 
Authority are disseminating a number of press releases on compliance convictions, emphasizing the 
punishments and unacceptance associated with poaching within the marine reserve (GBRMPA 2018). 
Another example of reinforcing social acceptability is through a shame file (Hook, line and stinkers) 
produced with government input, such as that published in a Queensland paper that listed cautionary 
tales of non-compliant convictions (without naming the culprits) along with reminders of the rules and 
regulations and illegal fishing hotline (Hall 2016). Although there is no empirical evidence to suggest 
this specific example is effective in changing behaviour, a field experiment tested the influence of 
shame on voter attendance in the US and found that people complied with voting norms when non-
voters were named in a local newspaper and the risk of shame was present (Panagopoulos 2010). 
Thus, using a shame file in a local newspaper may be an effective addition to laws and regulations for 
regulation compliance. 
There is generally little information available on actual compliance rates. The crude rate of non-
compliance - which is calculated by looking at the number of offences that are weighted by severity 
over the total number of contacts made by fisheries officers - in Western Australia remained around 
six offences per every 100 checks from 2000-2007 (Green & McKinlay 2009). More recently, as many 
as 18% of surveyed fishers admitted to poaching in the last year within the Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park (Bergseth et al. 2017). It has been said that the number of observed offences will be a function 
of enforcement effort as a fraction of the total number of offences committed (Green & McKinlay 
2009), with a suggested hypothetical relationship between enforcement effort and offences. While 
this estimation is useful as it offers an opportunity to derive a rough calculation for compliance rates 
it neglects the offences that are prevented through efforts other than deterrence. For example, the 
compliance issues associated with territory conflicts are predominantly self-monitored, and non-
compliance with consumption warnings for biotoxins are also self-monitored (Table 2.1). While 
coercive measures such as fines and prosecution are appropriate for recidivists or serious offenders, 
Chapter 2 When push comes to shove in recreational fishing compliance, think ‘nudge’ 
21 
persuasion and warning based compliance strategies can be used to influence accidental non-
compliers (Arias 2015). Managers may overlook self-regulation and voluntary compliance as 
compliance tools since there is no direct measure of their impact on convictions. 
2.4 Potential nudges in recreational fisheries 
As demonstrated through the discussion of Australian compliance issues, even when punitive methods 
are in place non-compliant behaviours can persist and additional management levers may need to be 
deployed. Nudges may be a potential, innovative tool to bolster traditional management by 
encouraging voluntary compliance by making certain decisions more salient. The use of nudges in 
public policy has increased over the past decade (Benartzi et al. 2017), including examples in energy 
conservation and energy efficiency investments, transport choices, water conservation and 
sustainable food consumption (OECD 2017a; OECD 2017b). Examples specifically targeting compliance 
behaviour can be found in taxation (Cadsby et al. 2006; Li et al. 2011) and  environmental regulation 
(Behavioural Insights Team 2015). While the use of nudges in marine management has been 
advocated for (Cvitanovic et al. 2018) there is little evidence of their application in addressing 
compliance issues in recreational fisheries management. A commonly used typology of nudges 
comprises four different types; i) simplification and framing of information, ii) changes to physical 
environment, iii) changes to the default policy and iv) use of social norms and comparisons (Mont et 
al. 2014; Lehner et al. 2016). This typology is used along with the extant literature on applied nudges 
in other sectors to identify a series of potential nudges that can be tailored to the recreational fishing 
compliance problem. Table 2.2 and the following sections describe these examples, linking each to the 
typology, the compliance issues and associated management control method it is intended to address. 




Table 2.2 Potential nudges for addressing compliance issues in recreational fishing. 
Management 
method Compliance Issue Behavioural Nudge 





Fishing without a 
license 
Social norms / 
simplification and 
framing of information 
Wording of licenses/ statistics e.g. 23% 
of people were checked by marine 
police last year/ 90% of people display 
their license ID number on their 
potting floats 
Defaults Automatic renewal for licenses 
Where 
Fishing within a 
protected area Defaults  
‘Opting-in’ to voluntary closures with 
the option to opt out  
When 
Fishing in a closed-
season 
Use of social norms 
and comparisons 
Regulation reminders including 
comparisons to previous year’s fishers’ 
opinions/ compliance rates 
How 
Not complying with 
gear restriction/ 
gear impacts on 
environment 





Illegal selling of 
catch 
Changes to physical 




faming of information/ 
Changes to physical 
environment 
Rephrase regulation reminders on 
apps from juvenile to baby fish/ little 
ones. Persuasive messaging on 
measuring rulers. 








framing of information 
Persuasive messaging and anchoring 
catch limit below legislated limit 
 
2.4.1 Simplification and framing of information 
Framing is already being used in recreational fisheries management to encourage compliance, for 
example, persuasive messaging can be seen on the ruler distributed by the Inland Fisheries Service 
that can be used to measure Tasmanian trout (Fig. 1a). At the legal minimum size limit the message 
“It may be to size but do you really want it” appears then along the ruler at increasing measurements 
it states; “Not bad!” “Impressive!”, “Worth bragging about!” then “Officially a monster!” (Fig. 1a). This 
type of messaging is intended to encourage fishers to aim higher than the minimum size by removing 
the size limit as the anchor and reduce the likelihood of fishers keeping anything below the size limit. 
Reframing information can also involve the use of descriptive words alongside informative words, for 
example “Grandma’s Zucchini cookies” instead of “Zucchini cookies” increased sales by 27% (Lehner 
et al. 2016). A comparable nudge is already being applied in Tasmania’s FishCare key messages, stating 
“Put the little ones back gently” to encourage fishers not to retain juvenile or undersized fish (Fig. 1b).  
 
Another nudge in fisheries management in Australia has been applied through the framing of the catch 
limit in a cattle and camping station in Western Australia. It states; “Ideally we would like visitors to 
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take no more than 2 fish per day to ensure the sustainability of this wonderful resource. We have a 
possession limit of 5kg. Catch a fresh fish each day, no need to freeze, there is no comparison to the 
taste” (Warroora Station, 2016). By first introducing a lower bag limit than the limit of 5 as set by the 
Western Australia State regulation (for the Gascoyne coast), people tend to use that as an anchor or 
reference point, and they will be primed3 to act according to this. The message is also framed based 
on personal gain from catching fresh fish and using descriptive words (i.e. protect the ‘wonderful’ 
resource), rather than framing non-compliance as a punishable offence. Framing has also been used 
as a nudge in healthcare, where patients were more likely to commit to having surgery when they 
were told ‘90% of people survived after five years’ versus being told that ‘after five years 10% did not 
survive’ (McNeil et al. 1982). A similar nudge in recreational fisheries could be applied in reporting 
enforcement statistics, for example, ‘23% of people were checked by marine police last year’ rather 
than ‘73% of people were not checked by marine police last year’.  
Figure 2.1 Examples of nudges used in Tasmanian recreational fishing and inland fisheries; a) an 
example of persuasive messaging regarding the minimum size of trout (text in red under the 
measurements); b) an example of simplification and framing nudge as part of the FishCare core 
messages to not retain juvenile or undersized fish; c) an example of changes to the physical 
environment nudge with a spray-painted reminder to measure catch that is the same size as the 
minimum legal size of the commonly caught flathead. 
3 Priming, here, refers to the cues that can unconsciously drive behaviour (Friis et al. 2017), for example, how 
background music will subconsciously influence wine choices (North et al. 1999) and description of taste 
(North 2012). 




2.4.2 Changes to physical environment  
Changes to the physical environment can act as a reminder or can deliver a message regarding social 
acceptability. An example is currently being used to reiterate the size limits of a popular recreational 
fish in Tasmania where the government has spray-painted a stylised picture of a Sand Flathead, along 
with the message “Measure your catch” (Fig. 1c) in certain locations. Changes to the physical 
environment like this have successfully reduced littering with green footprints painted on the ground 
leading to bins (Ly et al. 2013), and stickers near taps have assisted in water conservation (Datta et al. 
2015). Recent evidence has shown that people tend to act pro-socially when there is an image of eyes 
watching them. The influence of ‘being watched’ on people’s motivations is twofold, a positive 
motivation to gain future reward by doing the right thing and a negative emotion to avoid violating an 
established norm (Oda et al. 2015). The presence of eyes creates subtle cues of being watched and 
feeling seen, and it makes people act more honestly and pro-socially, as well as inducing a public 
awareness (Pfattheicher & Keller 2015). This nudge could be applied in recreational fisheries by 
displaying some similar watching-eye installations at popular boat ramps along with messages about 
illegal selling of catch, fishing for protected species, or fishing without a license. Additionally, the 
message along with a picture of eyes or someone looking through binoculars could be framed around 
encouraging fishers to report any non-compliance to further encourage self-monitoring on top of the 
cue to act more pro-socially. 
 
2.4.3 Changes to the default policy  
One of the most successful types of nudge is to change the default option. This builds from the 
understanding that many people dislike engaging in actively making a choice but instead will stick with 
the default (Beshears et al. 2008). Given this, if the default option is pro-environmental (or the type 
of behaviour managers want to encourage) it can have a large cumulative positive effect (Schubert 
2017). Large scale initiatives have been applied through default green energy policies. For example, in 
Germany 16% of energy providers automatically include their clients in green energy (Sunstein & 
Reisch 2016) by presenting this as the default option. There are a few examples of default nudges 
being applied in different Australian fisheries departments, but not yet targeting compliance. For 
example, defaults are being used in Tasmanian fishing licenses, opting in for digital licenses (DPIPWE 
2017), which will reduce costs for printing and posting, thus making more resources available for other 
purposes. To address compliance issues, an automatic license renewal could be established in 
recreational fisheries management to reduce the number of cases of non-deliberate fishing without a 
license. Incorporating default options in license renewals could include agreements to comply with 
voluntary closures or no-go areas but with the possibility to opt out if they desired. There could also 
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be additional fees included in the default to contribute to conservation initiatives to abate the impacts 
from boat or gear damage that has an opt-out option. 
2.4.4 Use of social norms and comparisons 
As social beings, individuals are influenced by the actions of other’s (social norms) and behaviours can 
be impacted through comparisons to peers (social comparisons). Within environmental management, 
in water and energy conservation, the practice of normative messaging has become an effective way 
to apply nudges (Ferraro & Price 2011; Allcott 2009). For example, descriptive social norm-based 
messaging for water management was found to have an effect on a short and long term basis (Bernedo 
et al. 2014). Experimentally social descriptive norms have also been found to increase cooperation 
between unknown subjects in common pool resource use when theoretically they should have 
behaved selfishly (Biel & Thøgersen 2007). This suggests people’s self-interest is bounded, because 
they are willing to sacrifice their own gains to help others (Mullainathan & Thaler 2015). 
Social norms have been shown to be particularly powerful in explaining recreational fishing 
compliance behaviour (Thomas et al. 2015) and is therefore likely an effective nudge. The presence of 
social norms on compliance behaviour can be observed through social media. For example, currently 
when a conviction of non-compliance occurs it will be widely circulated by some Australian Fisheries 
departments on Facebook. The response to these Facebook postings often includes a disapproving 
discourse. A post regarding a conviction for retaining undersized fish received comments such as; 
“Should be a more hefty fine and lose gear” and “Name and shame” by other members of the group 
(Tasmanian Fisheries 2017). This experience can be used by fisheries departments as feedback to the 
wider community of the social norm regarding recreational non-compliance.  
The strength of a social norm nudge can be increased with an injunctive norm, which includes a 
consciousness of what is accepted or opposed by others (Reno et al. 1993). Potential nudges that 
incorporate social norms and consciousness to elicit compliance in recreational fisheries could 
resemble feedback of previous fishers’ decisions in response to a regulation. For example, ‘According 
to last year’s data the average fisher was happy to catch less than the bag limit’. This statement gives 
consciousness of the decision as well as reference to the norm. A nudge based on social norms can 
also be complemented by simplification and framing strategies (discussed above). For example, in 
Western Australia people are required to display their potting ID license. Reporting by the Western 
Australia government could apply a descriptive norm to encourage compliance by stating ‘90% of 
people display their license ID number on their potting floats’ rather than “10% of people don’t display 
their license ID number on their potting floats” to elicit a change in behaviour. 
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2.5 Challenges and design considerations for nudges in recreational fisheries 
Nudges vary in approach, application, and according to the type of choice that is being influenced, 
targeting either subconscious or conscious efforts (although most examples focus on the subconscious 
(John et al. 2011; Moseley & Stoker 2013; Whitehead et al. 2014)). The use of nudges in public policy 
has not been without its critics, with concerns voiced about whether they are ethical (Schubert 2014), 
manipulative (Conly 2013) or are a risk to human agency (Waldron 2014). For example, the use of a 
social norm nudge aiming to reduce unnecessary laundering of towels in a hotel that used false 
statistics of reuse of other guests drew criticism on ethical grounds (Goldstein et al. 2008). In defence 
of nudges as a legitimate instrument of public policy Sunstein (2017) reiterates that they must 
preserve free choice, and while nudges can change people’s behaviour by providing information in a 
different way or making certain decisions easier, they must not be coercive. In the case of recreational 
fisheries, nudges may pose an additional risk to the legitimacy and transparency of management if 
they are based on false statistics or replace initiatives that require more resources like co-
management and stakeholder engagement, which have been shown to encourage compliant 
behaviour in fisheries (Jentoft et al. 1998; Kaplan & McCay 2004; Nielsen 2003). 
The effectiveness of nudges in creating the intended behavioural changes has also been questioned. 
For example, nudges that produce confusion, rather than simplifying choices, or nudges that result in 
reactive or ‘boomerang’ responses will be ineffective (Sunstein 2016). Within recreational fisheries, if 
fishers are not influenced by the actions of other’s or want to defy other’s expectations, they would 
not likely be influenced by a nudge using social norms and comparisons. For example, in a study on 
compliance behaviour within the Great Barrier Reef, 16-21% of the fishers surveyed reported that they 
did not care if others approved of them poaching. This attitude strengthened as social distance 
increased, i.e. fishers cared what friends and family thought, but not what fishers they did not know 
thought (Bergseth & Roscher 2018)  This suggests that injunctive social norms around what other 
fishers think is acceptable may not influence the behaviour of this sub-set of fishers and a social norm 
nudge based on this may not be effective. Some people may simply be emboldened by the prospect 
of disapproval and flouting convention, while other individual’s reflective judgements may not align 
with the norm and therefore not be influenced by it (Sunstein 1996). 
Additionally, the longevity of the influence of a nudge may be inconsistent and a pattern of ‘action 
and backsliding’ has been identified in some applications (Allcott 2009). When attempting to  change  
habits, as in the case of energy consumption, new behavioural patterns may be slow to become 
adopted (Michalek et al. 2015), therefore nudges should be applied on a regular basis to have a long 
term effect (Allcott & Rogers 2014). For recreational fisheries in which a one-time reminder of 




regulations or rules may cease to be salient and become background noise, nudges may need to be 
regular and periodically altered to stay meaningful and illicit a reaction. Additionally, compliance 
behaviour itself is dynamic, meaning that any management tool needs to be adaptive to account for 
this. 
 
The effectiveness of nudges may be weakened where they produce compensating behaviour (Sunstein 
2016). The history of fisheries management is replete with examples of such unintended 
consequences (Abbott & Haynie 2012; Cinti et al. 2010), for example with attempts to control total 
fishing effort regularly undermined by the ingenuity of fishers in substituting between various forms 
of controlled and uncontrolled effort i.e. when restrictions on the number of vessels results in 
increased vessel or engine size. Unintended compensating behaviours can also be expected in a 
recreational fisheries context. For example, in a recreational fishery in which a nudge improves 
compliance with spatial closures but results in an increase in pressure outside the closed areas, with 
overall negative ecosystem outcomes. Failure to account for these effects may unintentionally 
decrease ecosystem health or overall compliance. 
 
Poor or inaccurate understanding of the relevant choice environment can also contribute to 
ineffective nudges (Sunstein 2016). This reinforces the recent call for greater emphasis on better 
understanding of behavioural drivers of recreational fishers in complex socio-ecological systems 
(Bergseth 2017; Arlinghaus et al. 2016; Hunt et al. 2013). Nudge design will be further complicated in 
cases where there are large differences across individuals in personal characteristics and behavioural 
drivers. Costa & Kahn (2013) found evidence of varying effectiveness of an energy conservation nudge 
depending on political ideology and suggest that nudges need to be targeted to specific groups. The 
population of recreational fishers has been found to be highly heterogeneous in terms of socio-
economic characteristics (Floyd et al. 2006), attitudes (Lyle & Tracey 2016), values (Frijlink & Lyle 2010), 
and motivations (Copeland et al. 2017), suggesting that a ‘one nudge fits all’ approach to improving 
compliance is unlikely to work effectively and that multiple or different nudges will be needed to 
account for these groupings. 
 
The interaction between traditional deterrence and nudge interventions in recreational fishing is 
unclear. Nudges to encourage compliance need to be implemented in a way that encourages 
voluntary compliance without negating or undermining the effectiveness of deterrence. While 
economic incentives, on which deterrence is based, can motivate prosocial behaviour they can also 
weaken altruistic values (Lacetera 2016). For example, enforcement of gear restrictions has led to 
increased overfishing perhaps through crowding-out of the intrinsic motivations that underpin 
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voluntary compliance or by triggering  extreme non-cooperative behaviour in response to  those who 
break the rules (MacColl 2015). The implied feedback system between voluntary compliance and 
deterrence, means that it is possible that deterrence and nudge interventions are substitutes or 
complements. Understanding the nature of this interaction is critical to successful nudge design. 
Effective nudge implementation in recreational fisheries requires a systematic and rigorous design 
process. To this end, Ly et al. (2013) suggest creating  a ‘decision map’, outlining the critical actions 
involved with following through with a decision, such as whether to comply with a recreational fishing 
bag limit regulation or not. This involves considering broad properties of the decision (incentives and 
motivations), information sources, features of the individual’s mindset and environmental/ social 
factors. From this decision map, factors that prevent individuals from following through with their 
intention can be identified. These factors, which can be thought of as ‘bottlenecks’, are the points at 
which potential nudges may result in efficient behaviour changes and  where nudge efforts should be 
concentrated i.e. the biggest bottleneck will have the greatest potential for a nudge to have the most 
influence (Ly et al. 2013). Understanding possible behavioural influences, such as status quo or 
confirmation bias, and heuristics, like anchoring and social proof, involved in these bottlenecks 
informs the selection and design of a nudge.   
To account for the complexities of the behaviour of common pool marine resource users and for the 
fact that recreational fisheries are often based on stocks that are shared with other user groups, it will 
be important that potential compliance nudges are tested in a systematic and controlled manner, for 
example through repeatable field and laboratory behavioural experiments. Within this context, 
difficulties in predicting the behavior of fishers and their reactions to other fishers’ behaviour, the 
transient and occasional nature of recreational fishing, and the heterogeneity of fishers will need to 
be accounted for. Additionally, the ambiguous outcome of combining deterrence and nudge 
intervention will need to be acutely considered. The ‘test, learn, adapt’ approach (developed by the 
Behavioural Insights Team in UK and adopted by Australian Behavioural Insights Team) provides a 
useful model for progressing the use of recreational fishing compliance nudges, and is consistent with 
the adaptive management approach used in Australia and elsewhere. The iterative nature of this 
approach is essential when considering fisheries management, which must take account of a dynamic 
environmental, social, economic and political environment.  
As highlighted above, targeting the complex cognitive biases that influence individual choice and 
behaviour to produce improved recreational fishing compliance outcomes through nudges is likely to 
be challenging. Nudges do not offer a quick fix to replace cases where traditional policy instruments 
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have failed. Rather there is the potential for behaviourally-based management to augment and 
complement existing deterrence regimes and, while suggesting a number of potential nudges for 
compliance in recreational fisheries, caution is advised. As with any new and novel management 
approach, nudges need to be rigorously tested to demonstrate their cost-effectiveness and to avoid 
unintended consequences. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Recreational fisheries management aims to promote both sustainable and high-quality recreational 
fishing activities. However, knowledge about compliance rates of recreational fishers is scant and 
concerns have been raised over the impact of potential breaches in recreational fishing compliance at 
all scales. The effectiveness of traditional punitive deterrence is limited, yet compliance management 
is heavily reliant on this enforcement and monitoring intensive compliance approach, which is costly 
and seem to be associated with poor conviction records. In this chapter, the potential of behavioural 
based management, specifically nudges, to complement traditional deterrence approaches to help 
improve compliance in recreational fisheries is explored. Within Australia there are only a few 
examples of behavioural based measures in recreational fisheries compliance management found. 
However, based on their theoretical foundations, nudges may present an inexpensive, and potentially 
highly effective opportunity for recreational fisheries management. Several potential nudges that 
could be used to complement current compliance management (based on framing, changing the 
physical environment, presenting default options, and social norms) are suggested, albeit with caution. 
The history of fisheries management is replete with examples of unintended consequences, and hasty 
implementation of under-tested and poorly designed nudges might not achieve the desired results. 
However, through careful design and when embedded within an adaptive management framework, 
nudges have the potential to contribute to improved recreational compliance thereby avoiding the 
threats that non-compliance poses to marine systems, locally and globally.  
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4.1. Introduction 
Recreational fisheries are generally managed as a regulated open access resource, but the common 
pool nature of recreational fisheries makes them vulnerable to overexploitation. Due to the high 
numbers and wide distribution of fishers, however, enforcement of rules and regulations for 
recreational fishing is costly and typically low (King & Sutinen 2010; Nielsen & Mathiesen 2003). Non-
compliance is a complex problem in recreational fisheries management, having the potential to evoke 
uncertainty for conservation and socio-ecological outcomes and to undermine management efforts. 
Understanding compliance behaviour in recreational fisheries is thus of great policy and management 
relevance. Compliance is typically framed as a binary issue, wherein fishers are either compliant or 
not, with substantial research directed at measuring and identifying compliance (Sutinen & Kuperan 
1999; Honneland 1999; Thomas et al. 2016; Bergseth et al. 2017). Increasingly attention has also been 
focussed towards understanding the drivers and motivations of compliant and non-compliant 
behaviours (Boonstra et al. 2017) with several theories being proposed to explain why individuals 
engage in compliant behaviours (Bottoms 2002).  
For example, instrumental theories suggest that the decision of whether to comply or not is based on 
self-interested calculations about the expected costs and benefits of compliance, and that non-
compliance occurs because the cost outweigh the benefits (Becker, 1968). Rules and regulations for 
recreational fishing are traditionally designed and implemented based on the assumption that fishers 
are instrumental actors (Bova et al. 2017) with reported instances of improved compliance with more 
enforcement (Brouwer et al. 1997; Gigliotti & Taylor 2004). Normative theories, on the other hand, 
argue intrinsic values, such as an individual’s perceptions of the legitimacy and fairness of rules, are 
crucial to fishers’ decisions about compliance (Tyler 1997; Grimes 2006; Viteri & Chávez 2007; Tyler 
2006). In accordance to this theory, there are cases of high compliance where there is weak 
enforcement and low penalties due to established normative behavioural drivers (Gezelius 2003; 
Gezelius 2002; Sutinen & Kuperan 1999). 
In addition to instrumental and normative drivers, the literature suggests that psycho-social 
characteristics of individuals, such as attitudes, personality traits, and specific values towards the good 
in question, are important factors determining the patterns in individual compliance behaviour (Tyler 
2006) (Examples presented in Table 1). For example, individuals’ risk preferences have been found to 
be correlated with compliance with fisheries regulations (Brick et al. 2012). Other key psycho-social 
characteristics that have been attributed to compliance behaviour are social norms, such as morality 
and social reputation. There are several examples drawn from fisheries as well as wider literature that 
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build a strong case for the application of social norms in fisheries compliance management (Thomas 
et al. 2016; Sutinen & Kuperan 1999; Kuperan & Sutinen 1998). Another psycho-social characteristic 
influencing compliance behaviour is expectation of others’ compliance behaviour as it reflects social 
perceptions (Bergseth & Roscher 2018). Often expectation of others’ compliance behaviour will reflect 
an individual’s own behaviour. The expectation of others’ behaviour is regularly over-estimated, for 
example fishers who poach may also overestimate the prevalence of poaching (Bergseth and Roscher, 
2018; Rimal and Real, 2005; Berkowitz, 2005). Other psycho-social characteristics are ecological values 
and personality types. Environmental ethics literature suggests that having strong ecological values 
should render high compliance rates where non-compliance would result in some form of 
environmental degradation (Brennan and Lo, 2002; Nuyen, 2011). The relationships between 
personality types and complaince behaviours is not prevelant in fisheries compliance literature. 
However, personalty types, such as openness, extraversion and neuroticism, have been linked with 
rates of policy violations (McBride et al. 2012) within other compliance literatures. 
The overall aim of this chapter is to examine what psycho-social characteristics of individuals are 
associated with responses to instrumental and normative management incentives in a recreational 
fisheries context. While there is literature reviewing and testing some of the characteristics mentioned 
relating to compliance behaviours in fishing and non-fishing contexts, there is a gap in the literature 
exploring these characteristics concurrently within a controlled experimental setting. To achieve this 
aim, we conducted a laboratory-based economic experiment in which participants faced four 
hypothetical fishery scenarios where compliance is measured in terms of whether participants exceed 
a catch limit. The fishing scenarios use a combination of normative and instrumental incentives to 
encourage compliance behaviour with a catch limit. Building on the results of Mackay et al. (2019) 
which presents the results for each of the four scenarios, here we examine both consistency and 
variation in behaviour across the four scenarios. In doing so we can isolate the effects of an 
instrumental and normative compliance incentive in both a low deterrence and a high deterrence 
context. The implication of such a study will contribute to the gap in identifying the patterns in those 
who are consistently compliant, those who free-ride, and those who are influenced as intended by 
improving compliant behaviour for different incentives. 
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Table 4.1 Brief overview of psycho-social characteristics influencing compliance behaviour in 
fisheries and other contexts 




Non- compliance in 
marine reserves  Expectation of others reflect their own 




Expectations of others relate to behavioural 
intentions and often is over estimated  




selfishness or fairness 
Empirical expectations about other choices 
significantly predict one’s own choice (Bicchieri & Xiao 2009) 
Social norms 
Empirical testing of 
compliance models on 
recreational fishers’ 
compliance behaviour 
Norms are better at predicting compliant 
behaviour in recreational fisheries than 
instrumental drivers 
(Thomas et al. 2016) 
Empirical testing of 
norms on littering 
behaviour 
Empirical studies of norm conformity show 
that focusing people on an existing norm is 
an important step toward compliance 
(Reno et al. 1993; 




Fisheries compliance models including 
morality and social influence to better 
encompass compliant behaviour  
(Kuperan & Sutinen 






Ecological values and attitudes are key 
driver of environmental behaviour  
(Ones et al. 2015; 
Dunlap & Van Liere 
1978; Stern & Dietz 
1994) 
Philosophical argument 
on link between 
ecological ethics and 
behaviour 
Environmental ethics and the moral 
relationship of human beings to, and the 
value and moral status of, the environment 
and its non-human contents 




Review of agreeableness 
literature and 
performance in group 
game 
Compliant behaviour and co-operation 
linked to agreeableness  
(Digman & Takemoto-
Chogk 1981; Graziano et 
al. 1997) 
Review paper on 
agreeableness 
Agreeableness linked to altruism and 
prosocial behaviour  
(Graziano & Eisenberg 
1997) 
Meta-analysis on 
personality types  Deviousness linked to conscientiousness (Salgado 2004) 
Study on behaviour of 
steroid users  
Impulsivity - obtained higher scores on 
openness and neuroticism, although they 
presented lower scores on extraversion 
compared to the non-user group 
(Garcia-Argibay 2019; 
Fielden et al. 2015) 





More open individuals are less likely to 
violate cybersecurity policies. More 
Extroverted individuals are more likely to 
violate cybersecurity policies. More 
Neurotic individuals are less likely to violate 
cybersecurity policies 





Risk-taking related to taking initiative for 
pro-environmental behaviour when going 
against status-quo  
(Ones et al. 2015) 
Discrete choice 
experiment on fisher 
behaviours  
Risk-averse fishers would be expected to 
choose stable alternatives, while risk-
seekers would select more variable options 
provided these are associated with higher 
expected returns. 
(Girardin et al. 
2017;Brick et al. 2012) 
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4.2.1 Compliance decision data collection 
We collected compliance decision data by running an economic experiment in which student 
participants faced four hypothetical scenarios in a recreational fishery context (Fig. 1). At the start of 
each session, participants were provided an information sheet and consent form, in accordance with 
ethics approval from the Tasmania Social Sciences Human Research Ethical Committee (Ethics Ref: 
H0016420). A detailed description of the experimental design and procedure is provided in Mackay et 
al., (2019).  
 
  
Figure 4.1 Sequence of data collection within experiment 
 
In short, the experiment was designed to reflect the common pool resource context of recreational 
fishing with groups of six participants fishing individualistically from the same resource. This design is 
a standard static common pool resource game used in economic experiments (Castillo et al. 2011; 
Cardenas 2011). The experiment was run for 20 sessions with 120 student participants (i.e., 6 students 
´ 20 sessions) at the University of Tasmania, Australia from 12 May to 2 June 2017. For each session, 
a group of six participants earned money by ‘catching fish’, which reflects the enjoyment fishers 
receive from going fishing. The amount they earned was based on how many fish they decided to 
catch and the group total catch. Specifically, as each person caught more fish, they earned more 
money, however, as the group’s total catch increased ceteris paribus, the individual’s reward for 
catching additional fish decreased. To measure compliance, we set an individual catch limit of two fish, 
but each fisher had the option to catch up to five fish in each fishing scenario. Catch equal to or below 
the catch limit was categorised as compliant and catch higher than the limit was non-compliant.  
 
We encouraged compliance with the catch limit using a combination of two management incentives, 
specifically an instrumental and a normative4 incentive, resulting in four scenarios (Table 2). These 
were delivered through regulation reminders prior to catch decisions for each scenario. The 
                                                             
4 This was referred to as a ‘descriptive social norm nudge’ in Chapter 3. To avoid repetition on literature of 
Nudge Theory hereafter we refer to it as a ‘normative management incentive’.  
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instrumental management incentive was applied by setting the probability of having the catch 
inspected at either 5% or 20% to create low and high levels of deterrence. If inspected and found to 
have caught more fish than the limit, the participant received a payoff of zero. The normative 
management incentive was framed around a descriptive social norm. The norm depicted the catch of 
a typical fisher in a hypothetical fishery and was given alongside the reminder of the catch limit and 
level of deterrence (Table 2). The exact wording of the normative message was; “according to last 
year’s data the average fisher chose to catch only ONE (1) fish”. The experiment is a within-subject 
design in which each participant took part in all four fishery scenarios. To mitigate the potential 
ordering effect, the order of the scenarios was randomised for each session.  








Regulation reminder statement 
Scenario 1 5% No 
There is a catch limit of TWO (2) fish. There is a 5% chance that you will 
come across an inspector on your fishing trip who will be checking if you are 
within the catch limit. 
Scenario 2 5% Yes 
There is a catch limit of TWO (2) fish, but according to last year’s data the 
average fisher chose to catch only ONE (1) fish. There is a 5% chance that 
you will come across an inspector on your fishing trip who will be checking if 
you are within the catch limit. 
Scenario 3 20% No 
There is a catch limit of TWO (2) fish. There is a 20% chance that you will 
come across an inspector on your fishing trip who will be checking if you are 
within the catch limit. 
Scenario 4 20% Yes 
There is a catch limit of TWO (2) fish, but according to last year’s data the 
average fisher chose to catch only ONE (1) fish. There is a 20% chance that 
you will come across an inspector on your fishing trip who will be checking if 
you are within the catch limit. 
In this chapter, our interest is in understanding the association between individual’s psycho-social 
characteristics and their response to management incentives aimed at improving compliance 
outcomes. Specifically, we draw on the fishery scenarios to define three compliance cases, each 
comprising a base scenario and a comparison scenario in which either a normative or instrumental 
incentive is applied (Fig. 2). For compliance case 1, we compare behaviours with and without a 
normative incentive in a low deterrence context (Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 in Table 2). For compliance 
case 2, we compare behaviours with and without the normative incentive in a high deterrence context 
(Scenario 3 and Scenario 4 in Table 2). The third compliance case observes the influence of an increase 
in deterrence without the normative incentive (Scenario 1 and Scenario 3 in Table 2). 
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Figure 4.2 Fishery compliance cases. Using the four experimental fishery scenarios three compliance cases 
are defined by comparing compliance decisions in a base scenario and a comparison scenario. The three 
compliance cases are :1) normative incentive in a low deterrence context, 2) normative incentive in a high 
deterrence context, and, 3) an instrumental incentive via an increase in deterrence. 
 
4.2.2 Compliance response groups  
We constructed the categorical compliance response variable based on participants compliance 
decisions within the base scenario and comparison scenario (Fig. 3a) resulting in four nominal 
categories, namely; i) the compliers, ii) the free-riders, iii) the incentivized, and iv) the non-compliers. 
First, the compliers are those who were consistently compliant for both base and comparison 
scenarios. The free-riders are those who were compliant in the base scenario and non-compliant in 
the comparison scenario. The participants who behaved this way are named the free-riders as they 
have responded to the incentive in an unintended way, possibly in an attempt to maximise payoff on 
the assumption that others will comply in response to the management incentive resulting in their 
own  increased catch yielding a higher return. Third, the incentivized, who were non-compliant in the 
base scenario and compliant in the comparison scenario, are named as such as they have responded 
as intended to the management incentive. The final group, the non-compliers, were consistently non-
compliant across both scenarios. Each of the four compliance response groups are potentially 
characterised by different psycho social-factors which is shown conceptually in Figure 3b) and is the 
hypothesis empirically tested in this chapter to answer the overall research question. 
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Figure 4.3 Conceptual model of the research procedure. (a) Compliance decisions made in the base and 
comparison scenarios define the four compliance response groups (the compliers, the free-riders, the 
incentivized, and the non-compliers. (b) The research aims to identify a pattern in the five psycho-social 
characteristics of individuals in the four compliance response groups. 
The number of members in each compliance response group varies for the three compliance cases 
(Table 3). When the normative incentive is applied in a low deterrence context, the non-compliers 
formed the largest group (64). When the same normative incentive was applied in a high deterrence 
context, the largest group (63) were the compliers. The free-riders are the smallest group (< 10%) 
across all three compliance cases. Individuals may respond either consistently or differently to 
different management incentives. For the compliers, 28 out of the 120 participants were consistently 
compliant across all compliance cases, whereas 27 of the 120 were consistently non-compliant. The 
incentivized and the free-riders were less consistent across the three compliance cases, only 2 out of 
the 120 people were consistent free-riders for all three compliance incentives, and none were 
consistently incentivized.  
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Table 4.3 Distribution of the number of participants within the four compliance groups for each of 
the compliance cases 
Compliance 
Response Group 















The compliers Comply Comply 30 63 33 
The free-riders Comply Non-Comply 7 11 4 
The incentivized Non-Comply Comply 19 15 41 
The non- compliers Non-Comply Non-Comply 64 31 42 
There is a chance that the order in which the scenarios were played will influence the responses and 
consequently the compliance response groupings. For example, the comparison scenario could come 
before the base scenario for each of the cases due to the randomised order participants played the 
game. Therefore, to account for any ordering effect within these groupings we checked the 
representativeness of the full data set with two sub-samples. We did this by examining whether there 
is a statically significant difference in the proportion of each compliance response group for the full 
sample and the sub-samples. The first sub-sample comprised of data from the first two scenarios 
played and only the responses that were in the order of base scenario then comparison scenario were 
included (i.e. scenario 1 followed by scenario 2 would be included as data for case 1, scenario 3 
followed by scenario 4 would be included as data for case 2, scenario 1 followed by scenario 3 would 
be included as data for case 3). The second sub-sample comprised data from all four scenarios but 
only responses that were in the correct order were included (i.e. if a comparison scenario came before 
a base scenario it would not be included). These comparisons show that there is no statistical 
difference between either of the sub-samples and the full data set, suggesting that the randomised 
order of scenarios did not have an effect on responses and therefore compliance response groupings. 
The proportions for each of the sub-samples and the results of the proportional comparison statistical 
tests are found in Appendix 4A.  
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4.2.3 Psycho-social data 
In addition to the compliance decisions that participants made in the economic experiment, we 
collected information for each participant’s psycho-social makeup that might be associated to their 
compliance decisions based on a review of the literature (Table 1). The timing of data collection is 
shown in Figure 1.  The psycho-social characteristics considered in this chapter were (1) expectation 
of behaviour of others, (2) social norms, (3) ecological values, (4) personality types, and (5) risk 
preferences. A description of the variables relating to each of the five psycho-social characteristics is 
provided in Table 4.  
Expectations of behaviour of others 
In the experiment, and for each scenario, participants were asked about their expectation of the 
number of others they thought would not comply. They were asked this question at the same time as 
they determined the number of fish they were going to catch. Specifically, we asked “How many of 
the others in the group do you think will exceed the catch limit?”. We used this data to create two 
variables that capture in time expectations of others’ behaviours in both the base scenario and 
comparison scenario for each fishery compliance case.  
Social norms 
Participants were asked 14 questions on a 5-point Likert scale that make up the Social Norms Espousal 
Scale (SNES) proposed by Bizer et al. (2014) (Appendix 4B). This survey is used to assess individual 
differences in the extent to which people believe in and value social norms. Within this survey 
participants are asked to rate the extent to which the statements were characteristic of them. The 
statements are framed generally around the importance and influence of social norms (e.g. statement 
1: I go out of my way to follow social norms). Individual question scores are summed and the total is 
ranked on a scale representing participants’ values on a low to high value of social norms scale. 
Ecological values 
The New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) is a 5-point Likert scale survey to measure the environmental 
concern of people. We used the revised version proposed by Anderson (2012), which was originally 
developed by Dunlap and Van Liere to assess ‘’primitive beliefs’ about the nature of the earth and 
humanity’s relationship with it” (1978:427). The NEP scale is made up of 15 statements (Appendix 4C), 
within which three questions represent each of the five hypothesised facets of an ecological 
worldview, namely i) reality of limits to growth, ii) anti-anthropocentrism, iii) the fragility of nature’s 
balance, iv) rejection of human, and v) possibility of an ecocrisis (Dunlap et al. 2000). The intention of 
the survey is to develop a scale of ecological values from low ecological paradigm/ high social 
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paradigm to high ecological paradigm/ low social paradigm. However, this scale is only recommended 
for use when the result of one question is consistent with the results of the remaining questions (i.e. 
have a high corrected item total correlation). The responses were varied (Appendix 4C) and therefore 
we did not use the summed scores from the survey. Instead, we processed the scores for each of the 
five hypothesised facets of an ecological worldview using a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to 
reduce the number of ecological values variables from five (one per facet) to two (Appendix 4C).  
Personality types 
A widely recognised and accepted taxonomy of personality traits is the ‘Big Five’ (John et al. 1991). 
These five broad traits are; agreeableness (analytical/detached vs. friendly/compassionate), 
conscientiousness (easy-going/careless vs. efficient/organised), extraversion (solitary/reserved vs. 
outgoing/energetic), neuroticism (secure/confident vs. sensitive/nervous), and openness 
(consistent/cautious vs. inventive/curious). The Big-Five-Inventory was first presented by John et al. 
(1991) as a self-reported assessment to measure the five traits. In this study, we used a 10-item 
version of the Big-Five-Inventory (Rammstedt & John 2007) (Appendix 4D). Unlike the measures for 
social norm and ecological values the scores for personality type are not additive, and so we formed 
five variables based on their scores for each of the five personality types. 
Risk preferences 
In addition to the common pool resource game, participants were asked to undertake a paid 
experimental exercise in which they chose from a range of gambles to elicit their risk preferences. We 
used the Eckel-Grossman Risk Task (Eckel & Grossman 2002) which is an established way of elucidating 
risk preferences (Appendix 4E). Participants were asked to undertake the paid gamble in which they 
chose one of six possible gambles which all have the same 50/50 chance of winning as an assessment 
of risk attitudes. The gambles range from a safe bet with guaranteed but lower payoff, to a higher risk 
gamble with a larger payoff. Gambles range from risk averse to risk neutral to risk seeking. 
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Table 4.4 Summary of psycho-social characteristics 





Base scenario An in-time expectation of others’ behaviours as a 
measure of social 
perceptions 
Expect few others to 
exceed catch limit 
(other are mostly 
compliant) 
Expect many others to 
exceed catch limit  





Measure of the extent in 
which people believe in and 
value social norms 
Low belief in and value 
of social norms 







Rejection that humans are 
exempt from the 
constraints of nature 
Regards the world in 
terms of human values 
and experiences 
Regards the world in 
terms nature-centred 
system of values 
Environment-
alism 
Concerns for environmental 
protection and 
improvement of the health 
of the environment 
Low concern for the 
environment 





Taxonomy of personality 
traits 
Analytical/ detached Friendly/ compassionate 
Conscientious-
ness Easy-going/ careless Efficient/ organized 
Extraversion Solitary/ reserved Outgoing/ energetic 
Neuroticism Secure/ confident Sensitive/ nervous 
Openness Consistent/ cautious Inventive/ curious 
Risk preferences The attitude people hold towards risk Risk averse Risk seeking 
Note: Descriptive statistics for each of the characteristics is found in Appendix 4F. The possible range for 
expectation of behaviour of others is 0-5, social norms is 14-70, each personality type is 0-10 and risk 
preferences is 1-5. The two variables of ecological values are the PCA scores (Appendix 4C). 
4.2.4 Compliance decision and psycho-social data analysis 
To understand which of the psycho-social characteristics are related to the four compliance response 
groups, we used a multinomial (MNL) regression. We estimated a separate model for each of the three 
compliance cases (Fig. 2) to capture the change in participants’ decisions in response to either 
normative or instrumental incentives. Each of the three models includes all of the psycho-social 
variables as independent variables. Specifically, for each compliance case k (k = 1,2,3), we model the 
probability that individual j belongs to compliance response group m (m = 1,2,3,4) conditional on the 
psycho-social characteristics of the individual, that is: 
    (1)
where yjk is an indicator variable that takes value one if individual j belongs to compliance response 
group m and zero otherwise. Fkm is the cumulative distribution function which lies between zero and 
one and adds up to one over m; i.e.,   (i.e., each individual must belong to one of the 
response groups). In equation (1), the psycho-social characteristics of individual j is denoted by xi and 
β is a vector of the corresponding parameters. We used the multinominal logistic model to estimate 
the parameters in (1), thereby the cumulative distribution function is given as: 
( ) ( )'Probjkm jk km jp y m F x b= = =
1jkmm p =å
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, m = 1 (2) 
, m = 2,3,4 (3) 
We set the compliers as the baseline group (m = 1) as the compliers represent the behaviour that we 
want to emulate (i.e. it reflects the desired compliance behaviour of recreational fishers under all 
management incentives). Given the baseline compliance response group, the log-odds for all other 
groups relative to the baseline group can be calculated as a linear combination of the psycho-social 
factors, such that 
  (4) 
Therefore, the signs and statistical significance of each parameter  indicate whether a change in 
the psycho-social factor makes an individual’s membership to the compliance response group  
more or less likely relative to the baseline group (i.e., compliers). For example, a positive and 
significant coefficient for a characteristic for one of the compliance response groups would suggest a 
higher probability of an individual being part of that group. Given the number of independent variables 
included in the model (Table 4), the multicollinearity between each psycho-social factor is of potential 
concern in the regression analysis. We calculated the correlation coefficients and confirmed that the 
correlation between social norms, ecological values and risk preferences is relatively low (<0.25). 
Where a correlation coefficient was higher than 0.25 for expectation of behaviours of others and 
personality type, the model results were checked to ensure the multicollinearity did not confound 
results.  
4.3. Results  
4.3.1 Expectation of behaviour of others 
Among all the psycho-social factors, expectation of behaviour of others in the base scenario was the 
most frequent significant variable in explaining individuals’ membership in the compliance response 
group for both the instrumental and normative incentives (Table 5). For the non-compliers, the 
coefficient was positive and significant for compliance cases 1 and 3, indicating that those who have 
less faith in others to comply with the catch limit in the base scenario are more likely to be non-
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compliers. Expectation of behaviour of others in the base scenario was consistently significant and 
positive for the incentivized group for all the three compliance cases. Conversely, for free-riders, 
expectation of others in the base scenario was  significant for compliance case 2, indicating that those 
who have less faith in others to comply with the catch limit in the base scenario are less likely to be 
free-riders.  
Expectation of others’ behaviour in the comparison scenario was only significant for compliance case 
2 (Table 5). This result was found for the non-compliers and the free-riders. For the non-compliers 
group, the coefficient was positive and significant, suggesting those who have less faith in others to 
comply in the comparison scenario are more likely to be in the non-compliers group, reflecting their 
own behaviour as they are non-compliant in this scenario. For free-riders -who were compliant in the 
base scenario, and non-compliant with the incentive- the result was positive and significant, indicating 
that those who have less faith in others to comply with catch limit with the management incentive 
applied are more likely to be in this group. Expectation of others in the comparison scenario was not 
significant for any management incentive for the incentivized group. This suggests that in the case of 
a management incentive having the desired effect, the expectation of others is no longer correlated 
with an individual’s own behaviour within the comparison scenario. 
Table 4.5 Multinomial logit model results for expectation of others, social norms and ecological values 
Psycho-Social Characteristic 
Compliance Case 1 
Normative in low deterrence 
Compliance Case 2 
Normative in high deterrence 































(0.001) (0.676) (0.004) (0.118) (0.071) (0.066) (0.000) (0.637) (0.000) 
Comparison 
scenario 
0.221 0.542 -0.42 0.461 * 
1.244 
*** 0.239 0.23 0.542 -0.246 
(0.387) (0.215) (0.131) (0.059) (0.006) (0.438) (0.322) (0.184) (0.325) 
Social Norms 
0.068 -0.011 0.052 0.022 0.08 0.04 0.072 0.024 0.081* 
(0.120) (0.865) (0.318) (0.516) (0.139) (0.427) (0.123) (0.851) (0.067) 
Ecological 
values 
Rejection of human 
exemptionalism 





(0.244) (0.993) (0.149) (0.812) (0.746) (0.084) (0.064) (0.036) (0.037) 
Environmentalism 
-0.629 





(0.047) (0.545) (0.227) (0.848) (0.572) (0.830) (0.038) (0.888) (0.064) 
Note: This table reports the estimates of the coefficients and p-values in parentheses for the three compliance cases. The baseline 
compliance response group is the compliers. Significant coefficients are bolded, and significance level are: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
Full regression results are reported in Appendix 4G. 
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4.3.2 Social norms 
The estimated coefficient of social norms was not significant for the non-compliers or the free-riders 
for any compliance case (Table 5). The estimated coefficient of social norms was positive and only 
significant for the incentivized for compliance case 3, suggesting that those who have a high value of 
social norms are likely to be non-compliant when deterrence is low but compliant with high 
deterrence. The coefficient of social norms was not significant for the incentivized for the normative 
message incentives in either a high or low deterrence context which means there is no association 
between the value of social norms and the influence of a normative message on compliance 
behaviours. 
 
4.3.3 Ecological values  
For the cases where human exemptionalism and environmentalism is a significant predictor variable 
the direction of the effect is negative, indicating that those with high ecological values are less likely 
to be part of the response groups they were significant for (Table 5). For compliance case 3, the 
coefficient of rejection of human exemptionalism was significant for all response groups and 
environmentalism was significant for two response groups. These results suggest that those with high 
ecological values are less likely to be part of the groups responding in a way other than complying with 
an increase in deterrence, which infers compliers have high ecological values. By contrast, rejection of 
human exemptionalism was not significant for any group for compliance case 1 and for only one group 
for compliance case 2. This suggests that the link between human exemptionalism and responses to a 
normative management incentive is weak. Likewise, environmentalism was significant for non-
compliers for case 1 and not significant for any groups for case 2, suggesting that the link between 
environmentalism and a response to a normative management incentive is also weak. 
 
4.3.4 Personality type  
The ‘Big Five’ personality traits that are significant in this analysis all have a negative coefficient (Fig. 
4). This means that those who have these personality traits are more likely to be the compliers (i.e., 
baseline group). The personality traits that are significant, however, vary across both compliance cases 
and the compliance response group. For example, those with agreeableness, conscientiousness or 
extraversion as personality traits are less likely to be non-compliers in response to either a normative 
or an instrumental incentive (Fig. 4). In response to the normative incentive (in compliance case 1 and 
2) extraversion and openness were significant for the incentivized and the free-riders, respectively, 
indicating that those with these personality traits are less likely to be part of these groups and more 
likely to be the compliers. Finally, in response to the instrumental incentive, the coefficient of 
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conscientiousness was significant and negative again indicating those with this personality trait are 
more likely to be compliers than the incentivized.  
Figure 4.4 Multinomial logit model results for personality types for non-compliers, free-riders, and the 
incentivized for a) compliance case 1: normative message in low deterrence, b) compliance case 2: 
normative message in high deterrence, and c) compliance case 3: an increase in deterrence. Coefficients 
are included, and error bars indicate standard error. Significant coefficients are highlighted in blue, and 
significance level are: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Full regression results are reported in Appendix 4G. 
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4.3.5 Risk preferences 
Risk preference was significant in explaining respondents’ compliance response to both the normative 
and instrumental incentives (Fig. 5). For non-compliers, risk preference was significant and positive 
for all compliance cases, suggesting that those who are risk seeking are more likely to be non-
compliers regardless of the management incentive applied (Fig. 5). Risk preference was also significant 
and positive for the incentivized for compliance case 2, suggesting that those who are risk seeking are 
more likely to be in this group, which may explain why they were non-compliant in the base scenario. 
Risk preference is significant for the free-riders for compliance case 3. There are fewer significant 
results for compliance case 1 (normative in low deterrence) compared to the other compliance cases, 
which may reflect that the risk of being caught in this context is the lowest and therefore not a strong 
predictor for the incentivized or the free-riders. 
Figure 4.5 Probability plots based on risk preferences for each group for non-compliers, free-riders, and 
the incentivized for a) compliance case 1: normative message in low deterrence, b) compliance case 2: 
normative message in high deterrence, and c) compliance case 3: an increase in deterrence. Risk score is 
along the x-axis and probability of group membership (%) is on the y-axis, non-significant results are left 
blank. See Appendix 4G for detailed regression results including coefficients and p-values. 
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4.4 Discussion 
While we know that in fisheries people make trade-off decisions between following or breaking rules, 
it is of interest to determine how people respond to different management incentives. Accurately 
understanding the different responses to instrumental and normative incentives and highlighting the 
psycho-social patterns within these responses is highly relevant for fisheries policy. In our laboratory-
based economic experiment, in which participants faced four hypothetical fishery scenarios to provide 
the controlled setting to measure behavioural responses and to remove any potential confounding 
influences, we were able to shed light on this issue. While this chapter is framed around a recreational 
fisheries context, the compliance problems faced for other natural resources (Keane et al. 2008) are 
similar and potentially similar policy opportunities (as discussed below) may apply. In this chapter, we 
first identified patterns in compliance behaviour. The pattern reveals a group of people who are 
consistently compliant, a group who are consistently non-compliant, a group who respond 
counterintuitively, and a group who are incentivized to become compliant (as intended by the 
management incentive). In this chapter, we further explored how the pattern in compliance behaviour 
is associated with five psycho-social factors, three of which (perceptions of behaviour of others, social 
norms, and risk preferences) have separately been explored within the fisheries compliance literature, 
while two factors (ecological values and personality types) had yet to be explored. While information 
about these two latter factors is limited within the fisheries compliance literature, our results suggest 
that they are relevant predictors for individuals’ compliance response to different management 
incentives. 
To summarise the findings, we combine results for individual factors into umbrella factors to 
conceptually present the results in Figure 6. For example, the umbrella factor expectation of others’ 
behaviour combines the results of base scenario and comparison scenario, ecological values 
represents both rejection of human exemptionalism and environmentalism and personality types 
includes all five personality factors. The shading of the segments indicates that at least one of the 
included factors for the umbrella factor is significant (but not necessarily all of them). The aim of this 
chapter was to compare the role of psycho-social characteristics of individual fishers in explaining 
responses to an instrumental and normative management incentives. Each of the umbrella factors is 
statistically significant in explaining compliance behaviour in at least one compliance case and for at 
least one of the three compliance response groups (Fig. 6). For example, one consistent result across 
both the normative and instrumental incentive was the relationship between risk preferences and 
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non-compliance. The expectation of others’ behaviour was also the most frequently statistically 
significant factor (in 7 of the 9 cases5 – dark green shaded segment in Figure 6).  
Figure 4.6 Conceptual summary of the results. Shaded segments indicate if one of the factors included in 
the umbrella factors was significant and left unshaded if not significant. *Expectation of others combines 
the results of base scenario and comparison scenario, •Ecological values represents both rejection of 
human exemptionalism and environmentalism and ∞Personality types includes all five personality traits. 
Broadly we see that more psycho-social factors were statistically significant in explaining the 
behaviour of non-compliers and the incentivized compared to the free-riders. Individual’s 
membership in the free-riders is the hardest to predict based on the five psycho-social factors. This 
may be due to the low number of observations for this group and therefore the results for this group 
must be interpreted with care. Moreover, we can see that more psycho-social factors explain 
behavioural responses to an instrumental incentive than a normative incentive (Fig. 6). Ecological 
5 There are a total of nine cases, three response groups (compared to the ‘compliers’) and three compliance 
cases. 
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values, for example, was consistently a significant predictor for responses to an instrumental incentive 
but not for either of the normative incentives. The results suggest that there is a relationship between 
having high environmental values and acting consistently compliant because the relationship between 
ecological values and all other response groups (non-compliers, free-riders, and the incentivized) was 
negative and significant. That is to say, the compliers have higher environmental values than any other 
group in response to an instrumental incentive, suggesting that compliance behaviour could be 
encouraged by increasing environmental values and concern. These results are consistent with the 
behavioural literature suggesting a link between high environmental values and pro-environmental 
behaviour (Nuyen 2011; Ones et al. 2015). 
 
Social norms was only significant for the incentivized for the instrumental incentive. Social norms was 
expected to be a significant predictor, especially for the incentivized in response to the normative 
incentives. However, we find that social perceptions of others’ behaviours are more effective at 
representing the implicit expectations of an individual. The results for expectation of others’ behaviour 
suggests that when participants are non-compliant they think others are also exceeding the catch limit. 
This behaviour, also known as false consensus or pluralistic ignorance, can lead to misperceived norms 
and reinforce non-compliant behaviour (Rimal and Real, 2005: Berkowitz, 2005). Targeting these 
misconceptions results in a more accurate normative feedback with expected improved compliance 
(Bergseth & Roscher 2018). This can be achieved through highlighting pro-compliance perceptions and 
norms of fishers as well as reporting consequences of non-compliant behaviour (Bova et al. 2017; 
Bergseth & Roscher 2018). This could resemble social punishment through shame and moral 
unacceptance of non-compliance as well as traditional deterrence such as fines (Thomas et al. 2016; 
Mackay et al. 2018). The SNES survey is intended to assess individual differences in the extent to which 
people believe in and value social norms, however from our results it was related to the response to 
the instrumental incentive. Although instrumental incentives are expected to crowd out social or 
moral norms (Kroneberg et al. 2010; Barile et al. 2015), we find that high social norms value 
complements the effectiveness of the instrumental compliance incentive. 
 
There were differences in behavioural responses to an instrumental incentive and a normative 
incentive for different personality traits. For the instrumental incentive introversion was inferred for 
non-compliers for the case of an increase in deterrence. Non-compliant behaviour has been found to 
be associated with introversion but only when combined with high neuroticism (Gudjonsson et al. 
2004), however, neuroticism was not a significant personal trait in our results. The results also 
indicated a low likelihood of being non-compliant or the incentivized in response to an increase in 
deterrence for those with high conscientiousness. Low conscientiousness is associated with 
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impulsivity (Sharma et al. 2014). This suggests that impulsivity may be related to non-compliance 
when there is a low chance of being caught but it is over shadowed when there is a higher chance of 
being caught. 
Low conscientiousness is also linked to deviousness (Salgado 2004), which may explain why the trait 
is found to be associated with those who are non-compliant in response to the normative incentive in 
a low deterrence context. However, we did not find this result for the normative incentive in a high 
deterrence context, suggesting that the risk of being caught may overshadow the tendency to be 
devious. The only personality type that was significant for normative incentive in high deterrence was 
openness. Specifically, our result suggests that those who are open are unlikely to be free-riders for 
the normative incentive in a high deterrence context. This may infer that free-riders have low 
openness as part of their personalities. A low score for openness represents a consistent and cautious 
personality which would be unexpected for the free-riders as they become non-compliant and at risk 
of a penalty. This result is somewhat counterintuitive, but may be associated with the low number of 
observations for this group. 
For normative incentive in a low deterrence context, personality types were more frequently 
statistically significant. The results for non-compliers for this management incentive infer low 
agreeableness and low conscientiousness. People with low agreeableness tend to be less cooperative 
and more competitive in groups (Graziano & Eisenberg 1997), which may explain the non-compliant 
behaviour as participants may be acting competitively to make more money in the experiment. The 
results may reflect that the compliers are more agreeable which has been linked to prosocial and 
altruistic behaviours (Graziano et al. 1997). Introversion is expected to correlate with compliance 
behaviour since a typical introvert is depicted as a responsible person who is expected to be compliant 
(Gudjonsson et al. 2004). Consistent with the expectation, the results suggest introversion is 
associated with the incentivized for the case of normative incentives in low deterrence. This suggests 
that introversion is correlated with compliant behaviour for a normative incentive and non-compliers 
for an instrumental incentive.  
4.5 Future research 
In this chapter, we explore what psycho-social characteristics of individuals are associated with 
responses to instrumental and normative management incentives in a recreational fisheries context, 
yet there are some caveats to consider when interpreting the results. First, we use a controlled 
environment via an economic experiment with student participants, which is useful for minimizing 
potential confounders. However, we recognise that different demographics in a fishery or alternate 
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natural resource context may result in different conclusions. Second, while we find that the normative 
message in the experiment changed behaviour, a normative expectation can be strengthened on the 
belief that others think they should or have an obligation to conform to the norm (Bicchieri & Xiao 
2009). We envisage that future work can explore the use of normative messages that are not only 
based on what the wider group is doing but where the message suggests there is a consciousness of 
what is accepted by others to strengthen the normative expectations (Reno et al. 1993). We also 
acknowledge that there are a number of alternative psycho-social drivers to explore in relation to 
compliance responses. For example, while we found links between personality traits that are linked 
to impulsivity, it may be worth exploring the link between behaviour and impulsivity directly 
(Maccallum et al. 2007). Additionally, the role of self-control has been explored in the trade-off 
between short term temptation to be selfish and long term pro-social behaviour (Martinsson et al. 
2010), which would be highly applicable to natural resource use and actions impacting the global 
climate. Finally, there are several findings from this chapter and while we have highlighted the findings 
that we determined to be the most novel within the fisheries compliance literature, we acknowledge 
that there are many dimensions to the results and a number of interesting results were not developed 
in the discussion.  
4.6. Conclusion 
People respond differently to management incentives and often they respond in a way that is 
contradictory to expectation. While there are different instrumental and normative incentives that 
can be used to influence compliance behaviour, the aim of this chapter was to explore the association 
between individual psycho-social characteristics and compliance responses. We explored five psycho-
social factors: expectations of others’ behaviour, social norms, ecological values, personality types, 
and risk preferences. Our results highlight there are different psycho-social factors associated with 
certain compliance response behaviours. For example, risk seeking is associated with people who can 
be categorised as non-compliers. There are certain behaviours that are harder to predict, for example 
for people who behave contrary to the compliance incentive, who we labelled free-riders. We 
acknowledge findings outside the laboratory experimental context and fishery example may vary from 
these conclusions, but we offer a number of policy suggestions based on the results of our findings, 
such as emphasizing the risk of non-compliance and using compliance campaigns that target 
encouraging environmental concerns. The findings underline that there is significant heterogeneity in 
the associations between psycho-social make-up and compliance behaviours. Knowledge of this 
behavioural relationship can progress fisheries management towards increased innovation by 
encouraging the management of the individual fisher rather than the average fisher.  
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Chapter 4 Appendices 
Appendix 4A. Sensitivity analysis on ordering effect 
Table 4A.1 Comparison of proportions between full sample and two sub-samples to assess any ordering 
effect 





















The compliers 25 16.7 16.7 52.5 0 43.3 27.5 25 13.3 
(0.4431) (0.3838) (0.3689) (0.8535) (0.1077) 
The free-riders 5.8 11.1 8.3 9.2 0 20 3.3 0 0 
(0.3964) (0.6445) (0.0966)* (0.5244) (0.3149) 
The incentivized 15.8 22.2 20.8 12.5 0 10 34.2 41.7 40 
(0.4981) (0.5496) (0.7072) (0.6046) (0.5536) 
The non-compliers 53.3 50 54.2 25.8 0 26.7 35 33.3 46.7 
(0.7944) (0.9359) (0.9202) (0.9065) (0.2376) 
Number of observations 120 18 24 120 0 30 120 12 30 
Note: This table reports the proportion per compliance response group and the p-values in parentheses for comparison of 
proportions statistical test. Significant coefficients are bolded, and significance level are: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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Appendix 4B: Social Norm Espousal Scale Questionnaire 
Participants asked to complete the Social Norm Espousal Scale (SNES) questionnaire (Bizer et al. 2014) after 
completing the recreational fisheries experiment. Questions with asterisk (*) are reverse coded for the 
analysis.  
Q1. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the statements. 
Strongly 
Agree Agree Unsure Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 I go out of my way to follow social 
norms  1 2 3 4 5 
2* People shouldn’t always have to 
follow a set of social rules 1 2 3 4 5 
3* People should always be able to 
behave as they wish rather than 
trying to fit the norm 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 There is a correct way to behave in 
every situation 1 2 3 4 5 
5 If more people followed society’s 
rules, the world would be a better 
place 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 People need to follow life’s 
unwritten rules every bit as strictly 
as they follow the written rules 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 There are lots of key customs that 
people should follow as members of 
society 
1 2 3 4 5 
8* The standards that society expects 
us to meet are far too restrictive  1 2 3 4 5 
9 People who do what society expects 
of them lead happier lives 1 2 3 4 5 
10 Our society is built on unwritten 
rules that members need to follow 1 2 3 4 5 
11 I am comfortable only when 
everyone around me is following 
society’s norms 
1 2 3 4 5 
12* We would be happier if we didn’t try 
to follow society’s norms 1 2 3 4 5 
13* My idea of a perfect world would be 
one with few social expectations 1 2 3 4 5 
14 I always do my best to follow 
society’s rules 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 4C: New Ecological Paradigm Scale Questionnaire 
 
Participants asked to complete the New Ecological Paradigm Scale (NEPS) questionnaire (Dunlap et al. 2000) 















1* We are approaching the limit of the 
number of people the Earth can 
support 
1 2 3 4 5 1 
2 Humans have the right to modify the 
natural environment to suit their 
needs 
1 2 3 4 5 2 
3* When humans interfere with nature 
it often produces disastrous 
consequences 
1 2 3 4 5 3 
4 Human innovation will ensure that 
we do not make the Earth unlivable 1 2 3 4 5 4 
5* Humans are seriously abusing the 
environment 1 2 3 4 5 5 
6 The Earth has plenty of natural 
resources if we just learn how to 
develop them 
1 2 3 4 5 1 
7* Plants and animals have as much 
right as humans to exist 1 2 3 4 5 2 
8 The balance of nature is strong 
enough to cope with the impacts of 
modern industrial nations 
1 2 3 4 5 3 
9* Despite our special abilities, humans 
are still subject to the laws of nature 1 2 3 4 5 4 
10 The so-called “ecological crisis” 
facing humankind has been greatly 
exaggerated 
1 2 3 4 5 5 
11* The Earth is like a spaceship with 
very limited room and resources 1 2 3 4 5 1 
12 Humans were meant to rule over 
the rest of nature 1 2 3 4 5 2 
13* The balance of nature is very 
delicate and easily upset 1 2 3 4 5 3 
14 Humans will eventually learn 
enough about how nature works to 
be able to control it 
1 2 3 4 5 4 
15* If things continue on their present 
course, we will soon experience a 
major ecological catastrophe 
1 2 3 4 5 5 
§ Facets of an ecological worldview: 1) the reality of limits to growth, 2) anti-anthropocentrism, 3) the 
fragility of nature’s balance, 4) rejection of exemptionalism, and 5) the possibility of an ecocrisis.  
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Table 4C.1. Proportional spread of responses for each question in the NESP scale and the corrected item-
total correlations (last column) 
Question Strongly Agree Agree Unsure Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree IJ7K  
1 5.8 21.7 15.8 27.5 29.2 0.56 
2 3.3 17.5 20.8 40.8 17.5 0.46 
3 0.0 9.2 15.0 45.0 30.8 0.33 
4 9.2 23.3 46.7 20.0 0.8 0.10 
5 0.0 3.3 11.7 39.2 45.8 0.62 
6 20.0 44.2 13.3 19.2 3.3 0.07 
7 0.0 5.8 5.8 39.2 49.2 0.35 
8 0.8 8.3 17.5 40.8 32.5 0.47 
9 0.0 0.8 9.2 53.3 36.7 0.09 
10 3.3 5.8 15.0 42.5 33.3 0.34 
11 3.3 12.5 14.2 46.7 23.3 0.42 
12 4.2 10.8 14.2 25.0 45.8 0.43 
13 0.0 17.5 24.2 39.2 19.2 0.36 
14 6.7 15.8 34.2 29.2 14.2 0.23 
15 1.7 5.0 13.3 36.7 43.3 0.52 
Due to the varied corrected item-total correlation, the responses instead were grouped into the five 
hypothesised facets of an ecological worldview : 1) the reality of limits to growth, 2) anti-anthropocentrism, 
3) the fragility of nature’s balance, 4) rejection of exemptionalism, and 5) the possibility of an ecocrisis. (Dunlap
et al. 2000) and participants had a score for each. We then ran a PCA on the scores of the five hypothesised
facets of an ecological worldview to reduce the number of independent variables (Fig. C1). The first
component (which explained 45.2% of the data) was defined by one of the five facets; “rejection of human
exemptionalism”. Human exemptionalism represents the belief that humans are different to all other animal
and exempt from the constraints of nature, and the world is interpreted more in terms of human values and
experiences (Wallhagen & Magnusson 2017). The second component (which explained 20.7% of the data) was
defined by the other four hypothetical facets. We summarised the four facets to represent environmentalism.
Individual loadings on these components were used as two variables representing ecological values in our
model.
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Figure 4C.1. Principle component analysis plot of the scores of the five hypothesised facets of an ecological 
worldview (represented by the red arrows) to reduce the number of independent variables for ecological 
values from five to two. 
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Appendix 4D: Personality Test Questionnaire 
 
Participants asked to complete a Big-Five personality test questionnaire (Rammstedt & John 2007) after 




Q3. How well do the following statements describe your personality?  
 










1 …is reserved 1 2 3 4 5 
2* …is generally trusting 1 2 3 4 5 
3 …tends to be lazy 1 2 3 4 5 
4 …is relaxed, handles 
stress well 1 2 3 4 5 
5 …has few artistic 
interests 1 2 3 4 5 
6* …is outgoing, sociable 1 2 3 4 5 
7 …tends to find fault with 
others 1 2 3 4 5 
8* …does a thorough job 1 2 3 4 5 
9* …gets nervous easily 1 2 3 4 5 
10* …has an active 
imagination 1 2 3 4 5 
 
  
Chapter 4 Individual psycho-social characteristics are associated with compliance responses to management incentives 
in a recreational fishery experiment 
89 
Appendix E: Risk Preferences Assessment 
Participants took part in a paid experimental gamble taken from Dave et al. (2010) after the fishery 
experiment and before completed the surveys.  
You will select one of the six different gambles listed below by placing an X in the appropriate box. 
Each gamble has two possible outcomes (Heads or Tails) with a 50/50 chance of either occurring.  At the end 
of the session, a coin will be flipped to determine which outcome will occur. 
The amount you will be paid for this task is determined by: 
• which of the six gambles you select; and
• which of the two possible outcomes (Heads or Tails) occurs.
For example, if you select Gamble 4 and Heads occurs, you will receive 52 Experimental Enjoyment Units and 
be paid $5.20. If Tails occurs, you will receive 16 Experimental Enjoyment Units and be paid $1.60. 







Mark only one by 
placing an X in 
appropriate box 
Gamble 1 
Tails 28 50% 
Heads 28 50% 
Gamble 2 
Tails 24 50% 
Heads 36 50% 
Gamble 3 
Tails 20 50% 
Heads 44 50% 
Gamble 4 
Tails 16 50% 
Heads 52 50% 
Gamble 5 
Tails 12 50% 
Heads 60 50% 
Gamble 6 
Tails 2 50% 
Heads 70 50% 
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Appendix 4F. Descriptive Statistics for psycho-social characteristics 
Table E.1 Descriptive statistics for psycho-social characteristics 
Expectation of behaviour of others 
Social Norm
s 
Ecological Values Personality Types 
Risk Preferences 
Expectations of others 
(scenario 1) 
Expectations of others 
(scenario 2) 
Expectations of others 
(scenario 3) 


















Mean 3.13 2.50 1.48 1.34 44.25 0 0 7.19 6.65 6.13 6.11 7.16 3.77 
Standard Error 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.69 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.16 
Median 3 3 1 1 44.50 0.21 0 7 7 6 6 7 3 
Standard Deviation 1.60 1.64 1.40 1.29 7.55 1.51 1.02 1.68 1.73 2.08 1.95 1.76 1.70 
Sample Variance 2.57 2.71 1.97 1.66 56.95 2.28 1.04 2.81 3 4.34 3.79 3.11 2.89 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 23 -3.84 -2.81 3 2 2 2 2 1 
Maximum 5 5 6 4 63 3.20 2.68 10 10 10 10 10 6 
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Appendix 4G. Multinomial logit results 
Table G.1. Multinomial model results on responses to normative and instrumental incentives 
Psycho-Social Characteristic 
Compliance Case 1 
Normative in low deterrence 
Compliance Case 2 
Normative in high deterrence 


















Base scenario 0.941*** -0.173 0.895*** 0.311 -0.785* 0.441* 1.108*** 0.219 0.965*** (0.001) (0.676) (0.004) (0.118) (0.071) (0.066) (0.000) (0.637) (0.000) 
Comparison 
scenario 
0.221 0.542 -0.42 0.461* 1.244*** 0.239 0.23 0.542 -0.246
(0.387) (0.215) (0.131) (0.059) (0.006) (0.438) (0.322) (0.184) (0.325)






-0.257 0.003 -0.369 -0.043 -0.096 -0.438* -0.479* -1.267** -0.498**
(0.244) (0.993) (0.149) (0.812) (0.746) (0.084) (0.064) (0.036) (0.037)
Environmentalism -0.629** -0.305 -0.407 -0.05 0.229 -0.075 -0.725** -0.106 -0.607*(0.047) (0.545) (0.227) (0.848) (0.572) (0.830) (0.038) (0.888) (0.064)
Personality 
Type 
Agreeableness -0.496** -0.16 0.002 -0.091 -0.288 0.104 -0.189 0.04 -0.342(0.029) (0.606) (0.992) (0.607) (0.260) (0.641) (0.428) (0.940) (0.119)
Conscientiousness -0.525** 0.108 -0.305 -0.109 0.321 0.068 -0.578** -0.406 -0.504**(0.014) (0.757) (0.187) (0.496) (0.238) (0.749) (0.017) (0.413) (0.024)
Extraversion -0.009 0.118 -0.433** -0.2 0.187 -0.175 -0.427** -0.36 -0.26(0.958) (0.666) (0.039) (0.155) (0.384) (0.345) (0.035) (0.365) (0.165) 
Neuroticism 0.111 0.122 0.156 -0.17 -0.071 0.326 0.044 0.422 0.103 (0.520) (0.651) (0.423) (0.246) (0.729) (0.126) (0.812) (0.398) (0.534) 
Openness -0.142 0.219 0.067 0.003 -0.487* 0.33 0.083 0.696 -0.058(0.444) (0.475) (0.758) (0.983) (0.056) (0.123) (0.689) (0.132) (0.763)
Risk preferences 0.467** -0.215 -0.149 0.438*** 0.146 0.611** 0.650*** 1.401** 0.335 (0.020) (0.508) (0.518) (0.008) (0.545) (0.014) (0.004) (0.044) (0.103) 
Constant 0.366 -3.732 -0.528 -0.938 -4.388 -11.432*** -1.515 -14.034 0.803 (0.905) (0.444) (0.884) (0.741) (0.331) (0.008) (0.662) (0.154) (0.799) 
McFadden's pseudo-R2 0.331 0.214 0.308 
Log-likelihood -91.47 -110.00 -99.86
AIC 254.947 292.002 271.729
Likelihood ratio test (p-value) 2.943e-07 *** 0.002725 ** 4.975e-07 *** 
Number of observations 64 7 19 31 11 15 42 4 41 
Note: This table reports the estimates of the coefficients and p-values in parentheses for the three compliance cases. The baseline compliance response group is the 
compliers. Significant coefficients are bolded, and significance level are: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Effective evidence-based decision making is an onerous task for recreational fisheries management. 
Given the rising pressures on fish stocks and multiple benefits generated by recreational fishing, the 
need for responsible and sustainable recreational fisheries is increasingly recognised (Cooke et al. 
2019; van Putten et al. 2017). There is a myriad of policy options for the management of recreational 
fisheries with varying effectiveness in aspects such as fisher enjoyment, compliance feasibility, and 
biological stock sustainability. Successful fishery management depends on whether it incorporates 
various sources of uncertainty, including variability in resource dynamics (Hofmann & Powell 1998), 
error in reporting, monitoring and assessment (Agnew et al. 2009), and even politicised management 
decisions (Tsangarides 2007). Moreover, fishers’ behaviour contrary to management objectives or 
expectations is a consistent factor contributing to the divergence between the intended and actual 
management outcomes (Fulton et al. 2011). 
To account for behavioural responses to management changes, an acute understanding of fishers’ 
motivations to participate in the recreational fishery as well as their preferences towards different 
management tools is necessary. Fundamental to all recreational fishing is that it is a leisure activity 
(Cooke et al. 2019). As opposed to commercial fisheries in which motivations are predominantly 
related to economic rewards, motivations vary extensively for recreational fishers (Cooke et al. 2019; 
Fedler & Ditton 1994). Broadly, recreational fishers can engage in either catch-and-release fishing (i.e. 
non-consumptive) or harvest-orientated fishing (i.e. consumptive) (Cooke et al. 2019; Yamazaki et al. 
2011). However, beyond this dichotomy the motivations become complex and no longer mutually 
exclusive. These motivations include but are not limited to psychological and physiological benefits, 
spending time in natural environments, social engagements with others, a fishery/food resource, and 
engaging and overcoming skill and equipment challenges (Fedler & Ditton 1994). Although there is a 
plethora of research on fisher behaviour (Duttweiler 1976; Renyard & Hilborn 1986; Aas & Skurdal 
1996; Teisl et al. 1993; Matlock et al. 1988; Fulton et al. 2011; Hoshino et al. 2017) the link between 
these motivations and responses to management are not always considered by fisheries scientists or 
managers  (Fulton et al. 2011). 
Given the diverse motivations and non-market nature of recreational fishing, evaluating fishers’ 
preferences towards different management tools is non-trivial. Further complexity is added by the 
recent observation that it is unadvisable to reduce the preferences of heterogeneous fisher 
populations to homogenous ones which represents an average fisher (Matsumura et al. 2019). Two 
approaches that are commonly used to elicit the preferences of heterogenous recreational fisher 
population are (1) conducting a survey to obtain a self-reported measure of management preferences, 
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and (2) discrete choice experiments (DCEs). For example, previous survey studies have identified 
heterogeneous preferences of recreational fishers who are categorised by site (urban/ rural fishers) 
(Arlinghaus & Mehner 2004), locality (residents/ non-residents) (Teisl et al. 1993), water type (marine/ 
freshwater) (Frijlink & Lyle 2010), and avidity level (Mcllgorm et al. 2016). DCEs have also been used 
to categorise fishers’ preferences across specialisation (Beardmore et al. 2013) and fishing method 
(Aas et al. 2000). A major difference between the two approaches is that surveys directly ask fishers 
to self-report their perceptions of each management tool in question, while DCEs force respondents 
to consider different management tools and account for trade-offs between them. The dual 
methodology may be advantageous as the use of both a survey and a DCE enables one to determine 
fishers’ preferences and opinions on different management tools for comparable samples of fishers; 
however, such an application is limited in the literature.  
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate recreational fishers’ preferences of different management tools 
for a highly consumptive multi-method fishery. Specifically, we explore the potential heterogeneity in 
preferences among fishers with different avidity levels and fishing methods. We further examine 
whether, and to what extent, fishers are willing to accept trade-offs between changes in different 
management tools. We use the variation in avidity and fishing methods as a driver of heterogeneity 
in preferences as they are indicative of motivations and attitudes of recreational fishers. For example, 
avidity has been linked to centrality to fishing lifestyle  (Mcllgorm et al. 2016). While avidity can be 
measured in different ways, such as commitment to the activity (i.e. willingness to substitute for 
another activity) or investment in fishing (Ditton & Sutton 2004), we measure avidity by the number 
of fishing days per season. We used fishing method as a proxy for fishers’ differing in motivations or 
attitudes as (Lyle 2018) found that mode of fishing in the Tasmanian Rock Lobster fishery is correlated 
with fishers’ behaviour in terms of harvest and effort. 
To achieve the research aims, we conducted a phone survey and a DCE for the current license holders 
in the Tasmanian east-coast recreational Rock Lobster fishery. The phone survey was used to ask 
fishers’ opinions on how effective different management tools are at restricting catch and if they are 
supportive or opposed to the tool. Additionally, the DCE was used to assess if fishers’ utility is 
associated with a management tool and to what extent fishers are willing to trade-off a change in one 
management tool for a change in another tool. The fishery has extensive management in place, such 
as separate fishing licenses required for different fishing methods, bag limits, and seasonal closures, 
with expected further management to be implemented in the near future. Therefore, management 
changes are not solely a hypothetical scenario. In the Tasmanian east-coast recreational Rock Lobster 
fishery, the stocks have been in decline and consequently a ten-year strategy was implemented in 
2013 to rebuild them to healthy levels. To achieve this, measures to limit the amount of lobsters 




caught were implemented for the recreational sector, but it was later found that further restrictions 
are required to meet and sustain the stock rebuilding goals (See Box 5.1 for more details). As a diverse 
fishery, with divers, potters, ring, and multi-use fishers present, as well as broad avidity levels, there 
is an urgent need to identify fishers’ preferences towards different management tools and which 
groups of fishers would be most affected by management changes. 
 Box 5.1. Case study fishery 
The Southern Rock Lobster (Jasus edwardsii) is highly prized within 
Tasmania, Australia, by both recreational and commercial fishers. 
During 2017-18 season (November 2017- April 2018) 17,200 people held 
at least one recreational Rock Lobster licence (Lyle 2018). They are 
fished using pots, ring nets and dive collection and annual licenses are 
required to use each of these methods to fish recreationally. During 
2017-18 season, licensed recreational fishers were estimated to have 
harvested roughly 72,000 lobster, based on 77,209 fisher days of effort, 
with potting being the dominant fishing method used. The Rock Lobster 
fishery was concentrated off the east coast of Tasmania with this area 
accounting for 70% of the harvest (Lyle 2018). There are daily bag limits, 
boat limits, and possession limits in place as well as size limits, closed seasons and a total ban on taking 
females carrying eggs (Lyle 2018).    
In the 2005 management review of the Tasmanian Rock Lobster 
fishery, provision was made for an explicit catch allocation to the 
recreational sector. More recent concerns over the status of the 
east coast Rock Lobster stocks resulted in the implementation a 
10-year plan (2013-2023) to rebuild east coast stocks to greater 
than 20% of unfished biomass (DPIPWE 2018). The rebuilding 
strategy seeks to limit the total Rock Lobster catch from the east 
coast to 200 tonnes and is based on a notional resource sharing 
arrangement of 21% for the recreational sector (42 tonnes) and 
79% for the commercial sector (158 tonnes). Key elements of the 
rebuilding strategy relevant to recreational fishers involved 
dividing Tasmania into Eastern and Western Rock Lobster Fishing 
Regions (Fig. 5.1), reducing Eastern Region bag and possession 
limits and delaying the opening of the Eastern region fishery. 
Given a positive correlation between recreational participation 
and catch (Lyle 2018), the number of licence holders is expected 
to increase along with an increase in the stocks in response to the 
stock rebuilding efforts. As there is currently no limit on the 
number of recreational licence holders, further restrictions on 
catch or effort are likely required to curtail increasing pressures on the stock.  
    
Figure 5 1 Map showing Tasmanian Australian Statistical Geography Standard Statistical Areas Rock Lobster Fishing Regions 





Jasus edwardsii, Male, Maria Island, Tasmania.                   
Photo: Antonia Cooper. Reeflifesurvey.com 
 




5.2.1 Discrete choice experiment  
5.2.1.1 Conceptual framework 
Discrete Choice experiments (DCE) are a survey-based stated preference approach that can elicit 
respondents’ preferences for a good in question, such as preferences for different management tools. 
DCE evolved from Lancaster's (1966) theory of consumer behaviour, in which the utility derived from 
an alternative is associated with the attributes of the alternative. In DCE, the utility of alternatives is 
characterised based on the assumption that respondents choose the alternative that provides the 
greatest utility for them (Adamowicz et al. 1998). Specifically, our analysis relies on a random utility 
model, in which Unsj denotes the utility of alternative j chosen by respondent n in choice situation s. 
The utility Unsj has two separate components: i) an observable component of the utility, Vnsj; and ii) 
unobservable component, εnsj, such that: 
Unsj = Vnsj + εnsj      (1) 
The observable component of the utility, Vnsj, is expressed in terms of a linear combination of k 
attributes, such that: 
Unsj = βXnsj + εnsj     (2) 
where Xnsj is a vector of k observed attributes for the good in question and β is a vector of the 
corresponding parameters (i.e., marginal utilities). In choice situation s, respondent n will choose 
alternative j if Unsj > Unsi for all j ¹ i. Assuming a Type I extreme value distribution for the unobservable 
component, εnsj, the probability that respondent n chooses alternative j in choice situation in s is given 
by (Mcfadden 1981): 
     (3) 
Equation (3) provides a basis to model the choices made by respondents in DCE as a function of the 
attributes. That is, discrete choice data is used to determine the attributes, which are significantly 
associated with respondents’ utility, and the extent to which respondents are willing to trade one 
attribute for another or rather opt-out. Although a number of challenges have been identified (Carson 
2012; Hausman 2012), the usefulness of DCE to support policy-making has been widely acknowledged 
(Hussain et al. 2014; Rogers et al. 2015; Marre et al. 2016). The main advantage of DCE over a self-
reported survey is that survey respondents are placed in a choice situation requiring them to consider 
trade-offs between attributes and to choose the alternative that provides the greatest utility.  















Chapter 5 Determining fishers’ divergent management preferences in a consumptive recreational fishery 
98 
5.2.1.2 Discrete choice experiment design 
Alternatives in a choice task are defined by a set of attributes and their levels. Table 5.1 provides the 
description of each attribute and associated levels used in this chapter. We based attribute and level 
selection on a number of sources, including: i) an discussion paper summarising management options 
to restrain Rock Lobster catches (DPIPWE, unpublished data.); ii) results from previous recreational 
Rock Lobster surveys (Lyle and Tracey, 2016; Lyle and Tracey, 2017; Lyle, 2018); and iii) extensive 
discussions with fishery experts. Since the objective of the chapter is to examine management 
preferences and the fishery is predominantly a consumptive fishery, attributes around the fishing 
experience were not included.  
To determine the number of attributes and the levels, we first identified management restrictions 
which are already in place or have been discussed to be used in future management. We then selected 
five restrictions as management attributes, which are considered as the most effective at reducing 
catch in this fishery and having clear links to recreational fishing experience. The attributes included 
in the DCE are: (1) Daily Bag Limit, (2) Season length, (3) Maximum seasonal catch limit per person, (4) 
Minimum size limit for female Rock Lobster and (5) Penalties for non-compliant acts (Table 5.1). 
The daily bag limit at the time of chapter was two lobster. The bag limit had been reduced from five 
to three in November 2011 and then to two lobster per day in November 2015. Therefore, we 
considered a further restriction to one, as well as renewing the bag limit to three as the levels of this 
attribute. The levels for the season length and maximum seasonal catch limit were set based on the 
current season length (24 weeks) and the average ranges of seasonal catch and frequency of fishing 
events found in previous surveys (Lyle and Tracey, 2016; Lyle and Tracey, 2017; Lyle, 2018). An 
increase in the minimum size limit for females is another restriction that has been proposed as a 
measure to assist with stock rebuilding by providing additional protection to the adult (female) stock 
and enhance egg production. We set the levels of this attribute relative in scale to size increases that 
would provide at least a year of additional protection to breeding females. Finally, for attribute (5), 
we were non-specific with the non-status quo level and alternative since a penalty for a non-compliant 
act can take many forms. All attributes, except attribute (3), are already in place in this fishery – with 
the status quo representing the current management. There is currently no limit on the maximum 
number of lobsters one licensed fisher can catch in a season, however, implementing such a restriction 
has been discussed with resource managers and stakeholders as a potential tool to reduce the overall 
recreational catch. 
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In total, there are 324 combinations for the five attributes and associated levels in Table 1. It is not 
feasible to ask respondents to select their choice from the universe of all possible combinations. 
Relevant combinations of attribute levels can be generated in multiple ways, such as orthogonal 
designs (Louviere et al. 2000) or efficient designs (Rose & Bliemer 2009). In this chapter, an efficient 
design was used to avoid unrealistic scenarios in the management context of this fishery. Using a priori 
expectations of the parameter estimates, efficient designs can also improve the reliability of the 
estimated parameters (i.e., standard errors) for a given sample size (Huber & Zwerina 1996). The utility 
for each attribute was modelled using Ngene (ChoiceMetrics), which produced 18 choice sets (i.e., 
scenarios) with balanced utility, as per the efficient design. While it is possible for respondents to 
answer all choice sets, it is common to divide the choice sets into blocks to make the DCE quicker to 
complete and reduce participant fatigue. In this chapter, we had three blocks of six choice sets. To 
minimise any ordering effect, we randomised the order of each of the blocks into five orders. The 
order and block of the choice sets were randomly allocated per respondent.  
For each choice set, respondents were asked to compare the options and decide which option they 
would choose to renew their licence for or whether they would choose not to renew their licence (Fig 
5.2). Following the choice task, respondents were asked to complete a self-assessment on the 
understanding and confidence in completing the DCE. Respondents who opted out for every choice 
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set were removed from the analysis as these were considered protest votes (n=6), and those who 
answered ‘not certain at all’ to conducting the DCE were also removed (n=7). In addition to the choice 
sets, we collected data on fishers’ participation, fishing methods, demographics, and motivation and 
attitudes towards compliance management in the same survey.  
Figure 5 2. Example choice set given to fishers 
5.2.1.3 Data analysis 
Discrete choice data from the DCE were modelled by a conditional logit model which estimates the 
marginal utility associated with each attribute; i.e., β in Equation (3). Estimates of the marginal utility 
were then used to assess if and to what extent respondents are willing to trade one management 
attribute for another while maintaining the same level of utility. For this, the marginal rate of 
substitution between two attributes provides an estimate of the relative importance of one attribute 
compared to the other. Specifically, we calculated the ratio of marginal utilities of attributes (2)-(5), 
relative to reduction of bag limit by one lobster. For example, the ratio βseason length/ βbag limit represents, 
if the bag limit was reduced by one, how long the season length would have to increase to account for 
the utility loss. To examine heterogeneity in preferences, we first estimated the model for the entire 
Scenario 1 (out of 6) 
Please compare the following three options for the management of the Rock Lobster recreational 
fishery in the eastern region of Tasmania. Assuming these are the only options available to you, which 
of the options do you prefer? 
You should base your preferences considering your actual fishing experiences, for instance consider 
these options in relation to how often you go (or would hope to go) fishing/diving for lobster, your 
usual catch rates and the sizes of the lobsters you normally catch. 
Management feature Option A Option B Option C 
Daily bag limit 2/ day 2/ day I wouldn’t renew my 
licence Season length 8 weeks 16 weeks 
Maximum seasonal 
catch limit per licence 
holder 
12 lobsters/ season 8 lobsters/ season 
Size limit for females Increase by 10mm As is 
Penalties for non-
compliant acts As is Increase by 50% 
A1a) Which of these options do you prefer? (Please tick) 
Option A_____ Option B ________ Option C _______ 
A1b) If you chose Option C above, from the remaining two options, which do you prefer? (Please tick) 
Option A_____  Option B ________ 
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sample, and then for the sub-sample of fishers who used different methods and those who had 
different avidity levels.  
5.2.2 Phone survey design 
Previous phone surveys of the recreational Rock Lobster fishery have been conducted since the mid-
1990s and provide detailed information about the fishing activity of individual survey respondents, 
including the date, location, method, and catch for each day fished for Rock Lobster. The survey 
instrument used here is based on that used successfully in previous recreational fishing surveys in 
Tasmania (Lyle, Stark and Tracey, 2014; Lyle and Tracey, 2016; Lyle and Tracey, 2016; Lyle and Tracey, 
2017; Lyle, 2018) and independently reviewed by Pollock (2010).  
The phone survey asked about fishers’ opinions regarding a range of management options. The 
specific questions related to the research questions for this chapter, asked fishers their opinions on 
how effective six management tools were at restricting catch as well as if they were generally 
supportive or opposed to the tool (3-point Likert scale). The six management tools were; bag limit, 
season length, maximum seasonal catch, size limit, limiting the number of licences, and reducing the 
commercial catch allowance (see Table 5.2 for exact wording of questions).  
5.2.3 Sampling framework 
The survey sample was selected from the 2017-18 recreational licensing database administered by the 
Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water, and Environment. The data collection was conducted 
in two steps. First, a random sample of recreational Rock Lobster licence holders for the 2017-18 
fishing season were contacted by telephone and asked to complete the phone survey. Of 729 fishers 
contacted, 570 agreed and completed the survey between May and June 2018. Second, fishers were 
recruited from the phone survey to complete the DCE. Only those who resided or predominantly 
fished in the east coast region were asked to conduct the DCE. Of the 570 fishers who completed the 
phone survey and who resided or fished in the east coast region, 307 fishers agreed to do the DCE 
either via mail or an online platform (104 requested mail surveys and 203 requested online surveys). 
The online and mail surveys were conducted between May to October 2018 and 156 completed DCEs 
were received (51 mail and 105 online).  
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5.3 Results  
5.3.1 Distribution of fishing methods and avidity 
For fishers who participated in the phone survey, potting (either by itself or in combination with ring 
nets) was the most common fishing method used (51%). Multi-use (a combination of diving and 
potting or ring nets) was the second largest group (35%) and diving was the least common group (14%). 
The distribution was analogous between the fishers surveyed in the phone survey and the DCE (Fig. 
5.3a). 50% of fishers who participated in the DCE used only pots or pots and ring nets, 13% of fishers 
dived for lobster and 36% of fishers used a combination of these methods. The distribution is 
consistent with the distribution found in previous recreational Rock Lobster surveys (Lyle 2018).  
The distribution of avidity of fishers (i.e., reported number of fishing days per season) differed 
between the phone survey and the DCE (Fig.5.3b). The phone survey sample comprised of 60% low 
avid fishers (10 days per season or below), 29% mid avid fishers (11-25 days per season), and 11% high 
avid fishers (over 25 days per season). In contrast, the DCE sample consisted of only 42% low avid 
fishers, 32% mid avid fishers but 26% high avid fishers. The skew in avidity between the surveys –with 
high avid fishers representing more of the sample for the DCE - is likely because high avid fishers are 
more willing to take part in surveys related to fishing than low avid fishers. The correlation between 
fishing method and avidity was low for both surveys (r = -0.1 for phone survey and r = 0.07 for DCE), 
suggesting that heterogeneity in management preferences in the two categorisations of fishers may 
be different to each other. 
 a) b) 
Figure 5 3. Distribution of a) fishing method by license type and b) avidity of the fishers who took part in the 
phone survey and the choice experiment. 
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5.3.2 Phone survey management preferences 
Support varies across the management tools but is generally medium to high support (> 28%) except 
for limiting licence numbers (Table 5.2). The most strongly supported and perceived effective 
management tool for all fishers was a maximum seasonal catch. 75.7% of fishers thought it was an 
effective tool and 73.9% of fishers attested they would support it. When asked “How many lobsters 
would you consider as acceptable for such a seasonal catch limit?” as a follow up question, the 
responses ranged from 2-300 lobster per fisher per season. The median was 20 lobster per fisher per 
season (mean 25.9), while 16% of fishers recommended limits of 40 or more and 2% recommended 
limits of 100 or more lobster. The least supported and perceived effective management tool for all 
fishers was a limit on the number of licences. 77.6% of fishers thought it was not an effective tool and 
85.3% indicated they would not support it.  
 
There is a small proportion of fishers who were unsure about the effectiveness or if they would 
support any of the management tools (ranging 2%-10% across different management tools). The 
lowest proportion of unsure responses was for a reduction in daily bag limit, suggesting high certainty 
of opinion, whereas 10% of fishers were unsure for a reduction of commercial catch allowance, 
suggesting low certainty of opinion around this management tool. There is a strong positive 
correlation between supporting the management tool and perceived effectiveness (last column Table 
5.2). This suggests that if a management tool is perceived to be effective then it is generally supported 
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Table 5.2 Fishers’ opinion on effectiveness and support to management tools 
Management tool 
Effective Support Support 
effectiveness 
correlation (") 
Response No. % No. % 
Reduce the daily bag limit to one 
per day 
Yes 204 40.6 143 28.7 
0.792 No/ Not really 288 57.4 344 68.9 
Unsure 10 2.0 12 2.4 
Further reduce the length of the 
season (in the eastern region) 
Yes 272 54.3 244 48.9 
0.870 No/ Not really 205 40.9 235 47.1 
Unsure 24 4.8 20 4.0 
Introduce a maximum east-coast 
seasonal catch limit for each 
licence holder 
Yes 380 75.7 369 73.9 
0.885 No/ Not really 107 21.3 114 22.8 
Unsure 15 3.0 16 3.2 
Increase the minimum size limit, 
meaning more of the catch is 
released 
Yes 306 60.8 274 54.8 
0.848 No/ Not really 170 33.8 204 40.8 
Unsure 27 5.4 22 4.4 
Limit the number of licences that 
have access to the eastern region 
for lobster 
Yes 83 16.6 45 9.0 
0.899 No/ Not really 388 77.6 425 85.3 
Unsure 29 5.8 28 5.6 
Reduce the commercial catch 
allowance to offset any increase in 
recreational catches 
Yes 291 58.1 266 54.6 
0.881 No/ Not really 160 31.9 175 35.9 
Unsure 50 10.0 46 9.4 
We detect heterogeneity in support once we compare fishing methods and avidity levels (Fig. 5.4). 
Divers are the most supportive fishers for all management tools, except the introduction of a seasonal 
catch limit. A reduction of bag limit has significantly lower support from potters and multi-use fishers 
than for divers (χ2 = 15.20, df= 2, p = 0.0005). Likewise, an increase in size limit has more support from 
divers compared to potters and multi-use fishers (χ2 = 6.75, df=2, p = 0.034). There were no significant 
differences for the other management tools for fishing method. When categorised by avidity level, we 
observe that less avid fishers were generally more supportive of management tools. However, only a 
reduction of season length was significantly different for the levels of avidity (χ2 = 7.64, df=2, p = 
0.02194). 





Figure 5.4 The proportion of fishers who support each management tool for a) different fishing methods 
and b) different levels of avidity determined by the number of fishing days per season. Unsure and NA 
responses were removed. Significant difference between groups from chi squared test of independence 
indicated by the asterisks, (p-values:  <0.001 =***, <0.01= **, <0.05 = *, <0.1 = .) 
  
5.3.3 Discrete choice experiment management preferences 
The results of the choice experiment for the full sample of fishers showed that all management tools 
have positive coefficients, and this is expected as fishers on average prefer less regulation (Fig. 5.5). 
However, only a bag limit and season length were significant at the 5% level and introducing a 
maximum season length was significant at the 10% level. An increased size limit for females and 
increased penalties were not significant for the whole sample.  
Chapter 5 Determining fishers’ divergent management preferences in a consumptive recreational fishery 
106 
Figure 5 5. Conditional logit model results of the choice experiment responses for all fishers. Error bars 
indicate standard error (p-values:  <0.001 =***, <0.01= **, <0.05 = *, <0.1 = .) See Appendix 5 Tables 5A.1 
and 5A.2 for detailed regression results. 
When the model was estimated for the subsample of each fishing method, bag limit had a significant 
coefficient for all fishing methods (Fig. 5.6a), meaning that there is no heterogeneity in preferences 
towards the bag limit. The regression, however, shows heterogeneous preferences for season length 
and maximum seasonal catch limit. The coefficient for season length was significant and positive – 
indicating preference for an increase in season length- for potters and multi-use fishers, but not 
significant for divers. Likewise, the coefficient for maximum seasonal catch was significant for divers 
and potters only indicating preference for a higher maximum seasonal catch (the latter only at the 10% 
level). All other management tools; increase in size limit and increase in penalties were not significant 
for all fishing methods.  
Across all levels of avidity, bag limit and an increase in season length were the management tools 
which have a significantly positive coefficient (Fig 5.6b). A maximum seasonal catch limit was 
significant for low avid fishers only. An increase in size limits for females was only significant for high 
avid fishers while an increase in penalties was not significant for all fishers.  
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Figure 5.6. Conditional logit model results of the choice experiment responses for a) each fishing method and 
b) each avidity level. Error bars indicate standard error (p-values:  <0.001 =***, <0.01= **, <0.05 = *, <0.1 = .)
See Appendix 5 Tables 5A.1 and 5A.2 for the detailed regression results.
5.3.4 Management trade-offs 
The trade-offs fishers are willing to make for a reduction of bag limit by one lobster is reported in 
Figure 7. The results are presented for the full sample of fishers, as well as for the subsample of each 
group determined by fishing method and avidity level. Fishers are on average willing to accept a 
decrease in the bag limit by one lobster if the season length increases by 3.5 weeks (Fig. 7a) This trade-
off ranges from the highest for potters (4.5 weeks) and low avid fishers (4.4 weeks) to the lowest for 
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multi-use fishers (2.9 weeks) and high avid fishers (2.6 weeks). This result suggests that the value of 
season length is felt by most fishers but is relatively higher for potters and low avid fishers. 
The variability across different groups of fishers in the trade-off for season length is less compared to 
the other management tools. The trade-off for a maximum seasonal catch is highly variable across 
groups (Fig. 7b). The highest trade-off is for divers at 1.5 lobsters per season, indicating that divers 
would be most affected by the introduction of the maximum seasonal catch limit. For size limit for 
females, the trade-off is highest for high avid fishers who are willing to accept a decrease in the bag 
limit by one lobster if the size limit for females decreases by 2.9 cm. Finally, the trade-off for penalties 
is relatively consistent across groups, except for mid and high avid fishers.  
Figure 5.7 Trade-offs fishers are willing to make between a reduction in bag limit by one lobster and a change 
in a) season length, b) maximum seasonal catch, c) minimum size limit for females and d) penalties for non-
compliant acts. 




To account for behavioural responses to the management of recreational fisheries, it is important to 
improve our understanding of fishers’ preferences towards different management tools. To this end, 
we conducted a phone survey and a discrete choice experiment in the Rock Lobster fishery in the east 
coast of Tasmania as a case study of a highly consumptive recreational fishery with diverse fisher 
groups. Acknowledging the links between avidity and fishing methods as proxies for motivations and 
behaviours in this fishery (Lyle 2018), we focussed on these two categorisations of fishers to evaluate 
recreational fishers’ preferences of different management tools, which are either already in place or 
have been discussed to be used in future management to reduce catch and assist in stock rebuilding 
goals in the fishery. 
 
Overall our results show that preferences for some management tools are homogenous across fishers 
that differ in avidity and divergent fishing methods, while preferences for other tools are 
heterogenous. There was consensual aversion towards a reduction in daily bag limit for all fishers. This 
was evident from low perceived effectiveness and support as well as that a reduction in daily bag limit 
significantly decreases fishers’ utility for all groups. This was anticipated as it is a highly consumptive 
harvest-oriented fishery. A reduction in season length was another management tool that was found 
to impact most fishers’ utility, except divers and high avid fishers. In the phone survey, however, highly 
avid fishers indicated the lowest support for a reduction in season length and the trade-off between 
season length and daily bag limit had little variability across groups indicating a homogenous 
preference toward season length. In contrast to these management tools, we found heterogeneous 
preferences for an introduced maximum seasonal catch and an increase in minimum size limit for 
females. These results may reflect the fact that the management tools in which there was 
heterogeneity in preferences limit catch indirectly. A reduction in bag limit and shortened season, 
however, have direct and clear implications on expected catch and recreation time. There was clear 
consensus among fishers about these management tools, whereas a change in size limit or an 
introduced maximum seasonal catch require some individual reflection on their historical and 
expected catch rates and sizes.  
 
Among fishers who use different fishing methods, the phone survey results suggest that divers were 
generally the most supportive group for further management. However, the DCE shows that these 
fishers would be the most impacted if a maximum seasonal catch was implemented. This was 
indicated by the largest trade-off required in the maximum seasonal catch. This is expected as divers 
had the largest average daily harvest rates in 2017/18 compared to the other fishing methods (average 
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1.59 lobster per day fished for dive collection compared to 1.38 for rings and 0.73 for pots) (Lyle 2018). 
However, our results also suggest that most fishers will be affected if a maximum seasonal catch limit 
is implemented to meet the stock rebuilding goals. Given the number of recreational fishers in the 
2017/2018 season, the maximum season catch needs to be set at ~ 4 lobster per fisher to meet the 
42-tonne total allowable recreational catch for the east coast region of Tasmania. This is considerably
lower than the mean or median acceptable number of lobsters per season (25.9 and 20, respectively)
perceived by fishers.
Recreational fishing specialization, which is defined as a spectrum from “general interest and low 
involvement to specialized interest and high involvement” (Bryan, 1977: 175) is correlated with avidity 
(Han & Oh 2018). Our survey results found low avid fishers were generally most supportive for all 
management tools in the phone survey, except limiting the number of licences. This coincides with 
the findings in Salz & Loomis (2005), in which low specialized fishers were more supportive for 
regulations and acknowledged the detrimental impacts recreational fishing has on fish stock more 
than high avid fishers do. In our DCE results, compared to the other avidity levels low avid fishers had 
a larger trade-off for an introduced seasonal catch limit, even though such a limit is less likely to 
constrain their behaviour. Theory of specialisation in fisheries suggests that high avid fishers would be 
more accepting of further regulations (Bryan 1977). Our results were contrary to this for size limit for 
females and an increase in penalties as from the results suggest high avid fishers would be impacted 
by an increase in size limit for females and would dislike an increase in penalties for non-compliant 
acts. 
There are some caveats that should be considered when our results are interpreted and applied to 
other recreational fisheries. First, there may have been strategic bias in the phone survey in which 
fishers were asked to express their opinions about each management tool independently. Although 
the survey was conducted with no reference to government involvement, fishers may have not 
revealed true beliefs due to the sensitivity of the topic. For example, fishers may have indicated that 
a tool was not effective or not having support as they would not want this tool to be implemented; 
e.g., low support and perceived effectiveness for bag limit reduction. The joint use of an opinion-based
measure of management preferences and DCE analysis may help to identity such potential bias as
DCEs force survey participants to consider trade-offs between different management tools. Second,
there was a skewed representation of high avid fishers in the DCE data. This is consistent with other
literature, where a self-nominated survey represents a sub-population of more avid fishers (Mcllgorm
et al. 2016). Although our results from the phone survey and DCE are consistent with each other, the
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more significant preference heterogeneity across different avidity levels identified in the DCE analysis 
is possibly due to the higher representation of high avid fishers in the data. Lastly, we categorised 
fishers prior to the data analysis using fishing methods and avidity as they are indicative of fishers’ 
motivations and behaviour in our case study (Lyle 2018). However, in fisheries where these 
relationships are not well established, a prior categorisation of fishers is not possible. An alternative 
way to deal with potential heterogeneity in preferences is to use mixed logit or latent class models. 
While the details of these models are provided in (Hensher et al. 2005), both models assume that 
individual preferences for each attribute are not fixed within the sample but are drawn from a 




We set out to understand the uncertainty in fishers’ preferences across different fishing methods and 
avidity levels. We found that there is some certainty in opinions and behaviours for management tools 
and this was related to how direct a management tool has on catch. The importance, application and, 
novelty of these results relates to the added insight for decision makers towards effective evidence-
based decision making. Within this context, for example, it was clear that a reduction in bag limit or 
season length would be disruptive to all fishers. This may lead fishers leaving the fishery or non-
compliant behaviour. Changes to the management tools that had more heterogeneity and less 
consistency in preference and utility, such as an increase in minimum size limit, may be better received 
as they do impact catch but indirectly. Considering the multiple objectives that are involved in fisheries 
management, the results provide the necessary understanding of preferences across the groups and 
for each management tool. Management tools that target indirect catch reduction may be a more 
successful tactic to fulfil restocking goals while minimising utility impact of fishers. Using an approach 
to evaluate preferences for inclusion in the decision-making process is highly advisable as decision 
makers can justify decisions on accordant preferences and weight up the trade-offs for divergent 
preferences. We expect future research to build on this understanding that fisheries may have 
homogenous and heterogeneous preferences and behaviours to then better assess and explain 
actions in catch, compliance, and participation that may have previously been amalgamated and 
generalised across the fishing population. 
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Chapter 5 Appendices 
 
Appendix 5A : Conditional logit model results 
Table 5A.1. Conditional logit model on discrete choice experiment data for different fishing methods 
  All fishers Potters Divers Multi 
Bag limit 0.517 0.502 0.433 0.573 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Season length 0.246 0.280 0.207 0.205 (0.000) (0.000) (0.111) 0.011 
Maximum seasonal catch limit 0.044 0.059 0.164 -0.023 (0.072) (0.085) (0.014) (0.574) 
Size limit for females 0.076 0.061 -0.008 0.125 (0.209) (0.468) (0.961) (0.229) 
Penalties for non-compliant acts 0.103 0.102 0.057 0.131 (0.297) (0.460) (0.833) (0.433) 
Constant 
  
-1.979 -2.041 -2.045 -1.864 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of observations 2,574 1,314 342 918 
Number of subjects 143 72 19 52 
Log-likelihood -1459.7 -740.7 -193.7 -521.7 
McFadden's pseudo-R2 0.109 0.114 0.110 0.107 
AIC 2931.3 1493.5 399.39 1055.4 
Note: This table reports the estimates of the coefficients and p-values in parentheses from 
different model specifications. 
 
Table 5A.2. Conditional logit model on discrete choice experiment data for different avidity levels 
  All fishers Low Avidity Mid Avidity High Avidity 
Bag limit 0.517 0.616 0.437 0.517 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Season length 0.246 0.339 0.193 0.171 (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.068) 
Maximum seasonal catch limit 
0.044 0.109 0.027 -0.044 
(0.072) (0.004) (0.523) (0.374) 
Size limit for females 
0.076 -0.067 0.124 0.298 
(0.209) (0.475) (0.270) (0.010) 
Penalties for non-compliant acts 
0.103 0.186 -0.184 0.320 
(0.297) (0.223) (0.299) (0.106) 
Constant 
  
-1.979 -2.395 -1.657 -1.877 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of observations 2,574 1,080 828 666 
Number of subjects 143 60 46 37 
Log-likelihood -1459.7 -582.5 -486.7 -377.7 
McFadden's pseudo-R2 0.109 0.153 0.077 0.109 
AIC 2931.3 1176.9 985.34 767.43 
Note: This table reports the estimates of the coefficients and p-values in parentheses from 
different model specifications.  
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Minimising anthropogenic pressures on the ocean from recreational fisheries is complicated and relies 
on effective management and compliance. Encouraging sustainable recreational fisheries is difficult 
due to diverse motivations of recreational fishing and uncertainty in fishers’ behavioural responses to 
management changes. Understanding the human dimensions of recreational fisheries management, 
particularly motivations, behaviours and preferences of recreational fishers, is therefore necessary for 
effective evidence-based policy making (Beardmore 2013). This thesis has contributed to this 
understanding: first, by conducting a literature review on alternative compliance tools, such as 
behavioural nudges, that can be used to encourage voluntary compliance in recreational fisheries; 
second, by empirically exploring the role of a descriptive social norm nudge on compliance behaviour 
using an economic experiment; third, by examining the association between of individual psycho-
social characteristics and compliance behaviours; and, fourth, by measuring fishers’ opinions and 
preferences of management tools to reduce catch in a consumptive recreational fishery. 
This thesis took an interdisciplinary approach, drawing upon learnings from behavioural economics, 
nudge theory, compliance theory, and social psychology to explore the role of incentives on 
behaviours and preferences in recreational fisheries. In this chapter, I summarise the results of this 
research, and its contribution towards more effective understanding of recreational fisheries 
management and fishers’ behaviours. I go on to outline further research that is needed to develop a 
better understanding of the potential roles of incentives on behaviour and preferences in recreational 
fisheries. 
The thesis sets out firstly to explore the potential for alternative compliance tools to bolster traditional 
deterrence methods within recreational fisheries management. Chapter 2 explores the potential of 
nudges through a narrative review of the relevant literature with specific reference to the compliance 
of fishers within Australian recreational fisheries. Based on their theoretical foundations, nudges may 
present an inexpensive, and potentially highly effective opportunity for recreational fisheries 
management. There are examples of nudges in place in Australia using simplification and framing 
techniques and changes to the physical environment to encourage compliance with size limits. 
Chapter 2 also highlighted several concerns and consequences when nudges are applied as a 
compliance management tool. There are, for example, concerns around the ethics of nudging using 
false information or using manipulative tactics. Nudges need to be properly considered as to avoid 
any confusion or unintended consequences such as unintended compensating behaviours. For 
example, in a recreational fishery in which a nudge improves compliance with spatial closures but 
results in an increase in pressure outside the closed areas, with overall negative ecosystem outcomes. 
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Failure to account for these effects may unintentionally decrease ecosystem health or overall 
compliance. A ‘one nudge fits all’ approach to improving compliance is unlikely to work effectively and 
that multiple or different nudges will be needed. This chapter concludes in stating the importance for 
testing potential compliance nudges in a systematic and controlled manner and through careful design 
nudges have the potential to contribute to improved recreational compliance, thereby avoiding the 
threats that non-compliance poses to marine systems, locally and globally.  
The next two chapters (Chapters 3 and 4) focussed on empirical work and used an economic 
experiment to test a nudge/ normative compliance incentive intended to encourage voluntary 
compliance behaviour in a recreational fisheries context. The aim of Chapter 3 was to quantitatively 
evaluate how a nudge based on a descriptive social norm can influence compliance behaviour in a 
static common pool resource (CPR) game. Descriptive social norms – i.e. a message reflecting what is 
common practice among peers- have been found to be an effective factor among instrumental and 
psycho-social drivers at predicting compliance behaviour. Our CPR game has been further adjusted to 
better capture the recreational fishing context by using a specification of the payoff function that 
reflects two types of benefits, a direct use value associated with catching fish, as well as a benefit 
derived from the experience itself. The results of the economic experiment provide evidence that a 
descriptive social norm nudge and traditional deterrence may act as substitutes, suggesting that 
nudges may be a more cost-effective compliance tool than deterrence-based approaches when the 
total costs of enforcement are taken into consideration. We also found that the nudge was more 
effective when deterrence is low, but its effects become weaker when deterrence is already high. The 
experimental design also permitted to uncover the extent of heterogeneity in individuals’ response to 
a nudge and increase in deterrence, with evidence of ineffective and unintended responses by some 
individuals. For example, there are those who remained non-compliant or even increased catch in 
response to compliance measures. Overall, the results validate the effectiveness of a descriptive social 
norm nudge in delivering positive outcomes for recreational fishing compliance especially in contexts 
where existing deterrence mechanisms are initially weak.  
Subsequently, Chapter 4 investigated if there is any association between psycho-social characteristics 
and responses to compliance incentives. Accurately understanding the different responses to 
instrumental and normative incentives and highlighting the psycho-social patterns within these 
responses is highly relevant for fisheries policy. In this chapter, we first identified patterns in 
compliance behaviour. The pattern reveals a group of people who are consistently compliant, a group 
who are consistently non-compliant, a group who respond counterintuitively, and a group who are 
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incentivized to become compliant (as intended by the management incentive). In this chapter, we 
further explored how the pattern in compliance behaviour is associated with five psycho-social factors, 
three of which (perceptions of behaviour of others, social norms, and risk preferences) have 
separately been explored within the fisheries compliance literature, while two factors (ecological 
values and personality types) had yet to be explored. While information about these two latter 
characteristics is limited within the fisheries compliance literature, our results suggest that they are 
relevant predictors for different compliance groups across compliance incentives. The findings 
underline that there is significant heterogeneity in the associations between psycho-social make-up 
and compliance behaviours. Knowledge of this behavioural relationship can progress fisheries 
management towards increased innovation by encouraging the management of the individual fisher 
rather than the average fisher. 
Finally, the thesis explored the fishers’ management preferences towards different management tools 
in a highly consumptive recreational fishery. Chapter 5 used a combination of a discrete choice 
experiment and an opinion-based survey to explore the potential heterogeneity in management 
preferences in the Tasmanian recreational Rock Lobster fishery, Australia. This fishery has extensive 
management in place, yet further restrictions are required to limit the amount of lobster caught for 
the recreational sector due to declining stocks. This chapter uses the variation in avidity and fishing 
methods as a driver of heterogeneity in preferences as they are indicative of motivations and attitudes 
of recreational fishers. There are, however, difficulties in fulfilling stock rebuilding goals without 
impacting fishers’ utility if management becomes stricter. This chapter highlights that that is true 
when it comes to management tools that directly impact catch, such as bag limits and season length. 
This was anticipated as it is a highly consumptive harvest-oriented fishery. In contrast to these 
management tools, there were heterogeneous preferences for an introduced maximum seasonal 
catch and an increase in minimum size limit for females. These results may reflect the fact that the 
management tools in which there was heterogeneity in preferences limit catch indirectly and require 
some individual reflection on their historical and expected catch rates and sizes. Overall having an 
acute understanding of fishers’ preferences enables managers to account for potential behavioural 
responses to the management of recreational fisheries.  
Overall, this thesis has contributed to the understanding of behaviours and preferences specifically 
related to compliance and management of recreational fisheries. The research undertaken in this 
thesis is subject to several caveats and limitations, each of which provides avenues for future research. 
This thesis finds that there are potential alternative compliance tools for recreational fisheries, with 
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successful results from a controlled experimental context. There is scope for future research using the 
findings of Chapters 3 and 4 as a basis to conduct a field experiment with recreational fishers to test 
the influence of nudges on compliance behaviour. Alternative nudges and cognitive biases that could 
be used to leverage compliance tools include; altering the status quo and defaults, simplification and 
framing of messages which builds on the tendency that people rely on the initial information received, 
as well as changes to physical environment that can act as reminders. Each of these alternatives have 
potential to increase compliance and the effectiveness of which should be explored and tested. 
Additionally, while a number of psycho-social characteristics were examined to be related to 
responses to compliance incentives, we acknowledge there are other factors which may influence the 
effectiveness of compliance incentives. Other factors that would likely be related to compliance 
behaviour and effectiveness of compliance incentives are vast. For example, Costa & Kahn (2013) 
found evidence of varying effectiveness of a social norm nudge for energy conservation depending on 
political ideology. Previous behaviour and self-perception and the perceived seriousness of the act 
may also influence decisions to be compliant (Dodd 2018). 
 
Within this thesis we focussed on behavioural incentives in the context of encouraging voluntary 
compliance. There is scope to apply nudges to encourage other aspects of compliance, such as 
community based reporting. For example, the impact of social norms or framing of information could 
be explored and tested for effectiveness at encouraging others to report non-compliant acts. While 
this may be applicable for recreational fisheries in which there is less monitoring and enforcement 
capacity compared to industrial commercial fisheries, it may also be relevant in countries where there 
are coastal exclusions for small scale operators resulting in minimal monitoring. Within this thesis we 
measured a one-shot CPR game and a one-time assessment of management preferences. It would be 
of interest to explore dynamic and continuous contexts or projections to explain how the dynamics of 
social norm affect compliance behaviour and individual’s response to management incentives over a 
longer time frame. For example, it would be of interest to conduct a network analysis of how social 
norms spread throughout a population, for example using an agent based model. This would enable 
the path and projection of social norms to be modelled and a measure of the associated changes in 
compliance, or behaviour, or perception.  
 
Together this thesis highlights several drivers of heterogeneity within recreational fishing 
management. This thesis explored the opposing responses to compliance incentives, from consistently 
compliant or consistently non-compliant as well as those who improve behaviour or act 
counterintuitively. These responses are not random and it is useful to explore the drivers of them. For 
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example, this thesis highlighted that risk, personality, and perceptions are related to compliance 
responses. Finally, this thesis explored if fishing characteristics, such as avidity or fishing method could 
account for management preferences to give insights in to the heterogeneity within a fisher 
population. This type of improved understanding of fishers heterogeneity can reduce unintended 
outcomes of management interventions (Pine et al. 2009) and better predict and assist how 
recreational fisheries adapt and evolve to maintain resilience and sustainability on a global scale 
(Arlinghaus et al. 2013). The results of the research within this thesis provide empirical evidence of 
alternative compliance tools, such as nudges as well as drivers of different behaviours and opinions. 
The findings underline the importance of nuance and heterogeneity of fishers, behaviours, and drivers 
in the context of recreational fisheries. Knowledge of this variability encourages better integration of 
accurate human dimensions and can advance recreational fisheries towards innovation and increased 
effectiveness.  
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